The paper proves that any network IDS operating without maintaining complete, OS-specific per-connection state cannot reliably reconstruct the byte stream seen by the end-system. TCP and IP reassembly ambiguities guarantee unavoidable blind spots unless the IDS performs full per-target OS emulation—a fundamental architectural limitation, not an implementation bug, that applies equally to any DPI-based censor.

IP-level fragment overlap attacks operate independently of TCP: crafting overlapping IP fragments whose reassembly by the IDS yields benign content while the end-system's reassembly yields the true payload. The paper demonstrates this is a separate attack surface from TCP-level evasion, exploitable below the transport layer before any TCP stream reconstruction begins.

§3 defense

Different operating systems apply different precedence rules when TCP segments overlap—some implementations use 'first data wins,' others 'last data wins.' An IDS applying a single universal reassembly policy will systematically diverge from the actual target end-system whenever overlapping segments appear, creating a predictable and repeatable evasion surface that is an inherent consequence of policy misalignment rather than a configuration flaw.

§4 defense

An 'evasion' attack exploits the mirror condition: the IDS drops a TCP segment that the end-system accepts, due to differences in overlap-resolution policy. The IDS reconstructs 'ATTCK' while the end-system sees 'ATTACK'; the missing segment carries the content that would trigger the signature, leaving the censor with an incomplete—and non-matching—view of the stream.

§4 defense

An 'insertion' attack sends TCP segments with forged TTL values low enough to expire at the IDS/censor but not at the true destination. The IDS incorporates the spurious segment into its reconstructed stream—seeing 'ATXTACK'—while the end-system assembles the intended byte stream 'ATTACK,' causing signature-based content matching to fail without disrupting delivery.

§4 defense

Russian TSPU devices directly block ECH by dropping ClientHello messages that contain both an ECH extension and the outer SNI hostname "cloudflare-ech.com" — the static outer SNI Cloudflare advertises in all its ECH configurations. Blocking affects both TLS and QUIC. ECH connections to servers with Cloudflare ECH support but outside Cloudflare's official IP ranges are NOT blocked. TCP segmentation alone or TLS record fragmentation alone did NOT bypass TSPU ECH blocking, but combining both techniques did circumvent it. TSPU has also added TCP reassembly capabilities that defeat previously effective fragmentation-only bypasses.

2025-niere-encrypted §5, Figure 5 dpirst-injectionmiddlebox-interference

The GFI's HTTP and HTTPS filters are now stateful (requiring initial SYN packet with matching sequence numbers) and have been activated on all TCP ports—not only standard ports 80 and 443 as reported by prior studies. This is a significant departure from previous work that found stateless HTTP/HTTPS blocking limited to standard ports. The HTTP filter injects a 403 Forbidden blockpage (not RST packets as used by the GFW), while HTTPS injects a single RST+ACK packet. The GFI also exhibits TCP non-compliance (not requiring a full three-way handshake to trigger filtering), enabling outside-in measurement without in-country servers.

2025-tai-irblock §2.1, §3.2 dpirst-injectionpacket-injectionmiddlebox-interference

The Henan Firewall is stateless in two exploitable ways: (1) it requires the TCP header to be exactly 20 bytes—enabling any TCP option (e.g., TCP Timestamps, which Windows disables by default) to bypass it entirely; (2) it does not perform TCP reassembly, so splitting a TLS ClientHello across two TCP segments such that the SNI extension straddles the boundary bypasses the censor. Both bypasses require only client-side changes and have already been implemented in Xray, GoodbyeDPI, and Shadowrocket. TLS record fragmentation (splitting the ClientHello across multiple TLS records within one TCP segment) also defeats both the Henan Firewall and the GFW, since neither performs TLS reassembly.

2025-wu-regional-censorship §4.3 / §6 sni-blockingdpimiddlebox-interference

Longitudinal GFWeb data spanning 20 months shows the GFW actively patched previously-published evasion findings during the measurement period: overblocking bugs reported in academic papers were fixed, and fragmented-packet reassembly failures that researchers used to bypass blocking were corrected. This demonstrates that the GFW operator monitors published research and iterates on the system in response to disclosed vulnerabilities.

2024-hoang-gfweb Abstract, §5.4, §6 dpimiddlebox-interference

The SAT Móvil app (Mexico's official tax service, 1M+ downloads) consistently fetches its 'Chat' page over cleartext HTTP, exposing citizen ID numbers (CURP, RFC), passwords, and tax documents to any in-path attacker. None of the four major Latin American telco apps (MiTelcel, MiTigo, MiClaro, MiMovistar) implement HSTS on SMS-delivered external links, making all of them uniformly vulnerable to SSL strip downgrade attacks.

2024-kujath-analyzing §7.2, Table 3 dpimiddlebox-interference

China's Great Firewall showed anomalous inconsistency: 13 test vectors produced mixed outcomes—TCP RST injection on some executions and a clean server response on others—with circumvention rates between 10% and 35% across 100 executions per vector. The authors attribute this to heterogeneous GFW infrastructure components applying different HTTP parsing logic, a departure from the GFW's usual consistency.

2024-m-ller-turning §5.2 dpirst-injectionkeyword-filteringmiddlebox-interference