Publius splits document keys into n shares where any k reconstruct the document, requiring a censor to coerce only n−k+1 servers to suppress it. Because all Publius server locations are discoverable by any reader, the paper argues this threshold is easily achievable, making location-secrecy of storers a necessary — not optional — property for censorship-resistant storage systems.

Active-server document anonymity is achieved by routing decryption through a randomly chosen ephemeral 'decrypter' node: the storer holds only ciphertext {h}k while key k is delivered separately to the decrypter via onion routing. Neither the storer nor any other single node can reconstruct the plaintext share, so a storer cannot identify the document it is hosting even by attempting to retrieve it.

§2–§3 defense

An adversary who wishes to expose storers by having forwarders log storer identities must compromise all n−k+1 chosen forwarders before or during the publication event; forwarders that legitimately delete the storer mapping immediately after acknowledging publication render this attack ineffective unless the adversary pre-positions malicious nodes at sufficient density. The paper notes that with a reasonably large forwarder population the probability of the required simultaneous compromise is small.

§3 defense

The paper proposes a forwarder/storer role split in which forwarders hold only an anonymous return-address pointer to the storer, and deliberately forget the storer's identity upon receiving a publication acknowledgment. Because forwarders neither hold content nor retain storer addresses post-publication, coercing a forwarder after publication yields no actionable information about where shares are held.

§2–§3 defense