Under the paper's economic model, the aggregate censorship-resistance defense budget is always at least as large in a discretionary P2P network (nodes serve content they choose) as in a random-distribution network: for every node i, td ≥ ts, so the total cost imposed on the censor satisfies Σtd ≥ Σts. Equality holds only when all nodes share identical preferences (ri = rs); in all other cases discretionary distribution is strictly harder to censor.

The paper argues that censorship is an economic activity in which both censor and target incur costs, and that binary 'blocked/unblocked' models are as unrealistic as an omnipotent global adversary. Technology changes (e.g., moveable type, online publishing, trusted computing) can shift the cost parameters dramatically, making quantitative cost modeling — rather than binary vulnerability analysis — the correct framing for censorship-resistance evaluation.

§6 policy

Discretionary P2P networks avoid the social-choice and incentive-manipulation problems inherent in random distribution, which requires collective agreement on a system-wide resource ratio (rs, bs) and thus creates incentives to subvert voting or reputation mechanisms. By allowing nodes to self-select content, discretionary systems need no election schemes, reputation systems, or electronic cash, enabling simpler and more stable designs.

§7 defense

In a random-distribution network, nodes whose utility is non-decreasing under censorship will set their defense budget to zero. For example, in a network with rs = 0.5 (equal red/blue), a censor shifting the distribution to rc = 0 (all blue) increases the utility of strongly blue-preferring nodes; they then invest nothing in resistance, reducing aggregate network defense.

§4–§5 defense

Under the paper's quadratic utility function and linear defense probability P(t) = t/T, a node will invest zero resources fighting censorship when the censor's imposed distribution reduces its utility by less than half (i.e., when Ui(rc,bc) ≥ Ui(ri,bi)/2). Nodes whose preferences most diverge from the censor's are the first to resist; mild censorship therefore attracts little aggregate resistance.

§6.2 evaluation