Using Tor exit nodes to query the bridge authority, the authors enumerated 247 bridge descriptors over two weeks (out of 1,716 active bridges during that period). An adversary running a relay advertising just 10 MBps of bandwidth would discover 63% of bridges that relay at least 40 circuits and 87% of bridges running at least 80 circuits, because all Tor clients proactively build circuits every 10 minutes.

A circuit-clogging attack against bridge operators—using median-normalized latency correlations—achieved an AUC of 0.884 and an equal error rate of 0.2 when distinguishing the victim bridge from innocent bridges in PlanetLab experiments with 180 victim and 180 disjoint runs. With 10 repeated clogging experiments and a majority-vote threshold, the false positive (and false negative) rate drops below 0.033, confirming a bridge operator's identity with high confidence given a candidate set of ≤4.4 bridges from the winnowing stage.

§3.4 detection

The architectural coupling of 'surfing' and 'serving' in Tor's bridge design—where enabling the bridge service is required to use Tor as a client—means a bridge always accepts connections whenever its operator is online, allowing a remote non-global adversary to probe a bridge's availability at negligible cost (less than 2 bps per bridge per status check via SYN/RST). Of the 247 enumerated bridges, only an average of 29.6 (just over 10%) were accessible at any given moment, providing a highly discriminating availability signal for intersection attacks.

§2.2, §4.2 evaluation

An 'unfair queuing' mechanism that partitions CPU time between bridge-operator circuits and bridge-client circuits using a time-allocation parameter τ=0.9 reduced the circuit-clogging AUC from 0.884 to 0.520 (median-normalized) and 0.412 (mean-normalized)—indistinguishable from random guessing—in 20 PlanetLab experiments. The mechanism eliminates latency interference between the two circuit types without requiring the bridge to ever refuse connections, but introduces up to 1−τ performance loss for client traffic.

§4.3 defense

Cross-referencing the online/offline status of 87 monitored bridges against 186,935 Wikipedia users' edit sessions showed that 95.7% of users with 50 or more sessions matched zero bridges after winnowing. For users with 180 or more sessions (a surrogate for long-term pseudonymous activity), only 89 false positives remained among 2,329 users—a false positive rate of 0.000439—meaning that even if 10,000 Tor clients volunteer to bridge, on average only 4.4 bridges remain after the winnowing stage.

§3.3 detection

InterSecLab's 76-page analysis of the Geedge/MESA leak (based on nine months of indexing and translating >100,000 documents) characterizes the Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG) product line as a commercially deployable detection stack that combines deep packet inspection, real-time mobile subscriber monitoring, active probing, ML-based traffic classifiers, and granular per-region rule sets. TSG is not a research prototype — leaked documentation includes deployment timelines and client government interactions for Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Myanmar, and one unnamed country, with censorship rules explicitly tailored to each region.

2025-interseclab-internet-coup §3–§5 (InterSecLab report) dpiactive-probingml-classifiersni-blockingip-blockingtraffic-shapefully-encrypted-detect

Justice for Myanmar documents that Geedge Networks supplied Myanmar's military junta with GFW-derived surveillance and censorship infrastructure under Belt and Road frameworks following the February 2021 coup. The deployed system (Tiangou Secure Gateway / TSG) incorporates the same DPI, active-probing, and ML-classifier capabilities as the domestic Chinese GFW, giving Myanmar one of the most technically capable censorship systems in Southeast Asia.

2025-jfm-silk-road-surveillance §3, §5 dpisni-blockingip-blockingtraffic-shapeml-classifieractive-probing

Snowflake's sustained operation in heavily censored regions demonstrates that WebRTC must remain accessible to users, which in turn requires that TURN servers remain unblocked to support NAT traversal for peer-to-peer WebRTC connections. This transitive unblockability makes TURN service providers viable rendezvous channels for the Bridge Distribution Problem.

2025-vilalonga-extended §3.2 Bridge Distribution Problem ip-blockingactive-probing

TURN servers used by major applications such as Facebook Messenger for media relay are hypothesized to be less likely blocked in censored regions due to collateral damage to legitimate WebRTC traffic. Providers like Cloudflare, Metered Video, and ExpressTURN supply geographically distributed TURN infrastructure that can be used without any special configuration by a censorship evasion system.

2025-vilalonga-extended §1 Introduction & Background dpiactive-probingip-blocking

Traffic splitting across N TURN proxies (1 ≤ N ≤ M) is hypothesized to resist active probing because each TURN server responds to probing requests identically to a regular TURN server, providing no distinguishing signal. Additionally, proxy ephemerality combined with splitting allows on-the-fly migration to new proxies when existing ones are blocked, maintaining connectivity even under partial blocking.

2025-vilalonga-extended §3.3 Censorship Evasion active-probingip-blockingdpi

The paper defines Unauthenticated Push (UP) channels as a distinct archetype from signaling/rendezvous channels, characterized by three properties: strictly unidirectional delivery, no client authentication or account association required, and higher bandwidth (kilobytes to megabytes) to support software updates rather than just minimal proxy-address exchanges. This design deliberately shifts operational-security burden onto senders to approach receiver anonymity.

2025-vines-extended §1–§3 ip-blockingactive-probing