Iran's nationwide censorship redirect page is hosted at private IP 10.10.34.34, operated by Data Communication Affairs (a subdivision of TCI's Information Technology Company, AS12880). Traceroute data confirms the final public hop before this private host is 195.146.33.29, registered to Data Communication Affairs, and 24 of 27 tested Iranian networks (89%) can reach it.

Iran has deployed a 'dual-stack' addressing pattern in which the same server receives both a globally routable public IP and an RFC1918 private address, enabling failover between global and domestic routing. DNS records document this for entities ranging from ISPs (acc4.pishgaman.net: 81.12.49.108 / 10.8.218.4) to government organizations (Vice Presidency for Management Development: 10.30.5.163 / 10.30.5.148) and private companies.

§5, Appendix Fig. 8 deployment

A scan of the full 10.0.0.0/8 block from within Iran identified 45,928 active hosts, including 20,060 on Telnet (port 23), 9,960 on HTTP (port 80), 8,029 on SSH (port 22), and 2,510 on DNS (port 53). Identified participants include TCI, government ministries (Agriculture, Education, Science), universities, and ADSL providers, establishing the private network as a purposefully designed national intranet in place since at least 2010.

§4, §5 deployment

Using open HTTP proxies distributed across 27 Iranian ASNs, the study confirmed 89% (24/27) of tested networks could reach the private filtering page (10.10.34.34) and 77% (21/27) could reach Imam Reza University's private IP. Of 15 proxies on RFC1918 addresses themselves, 13 (87%) could also reach the filtering page, confirming nationwide — not localized — private-space reachability.

§4.1 evaluation

Several Iranian domains maintain DNS A records pointing to RFC1918 private addresses that resolve only when queried against Iranian nameservers (IRNIC); the same query to Google's public DNS (8.8.8.8) returns REFUSED. Domains including realm.blizz.ir (→ 10.175.27.120), isftak.ir, and geeges.co.ir exhibit this split-DNS pattern as of September 2012.

§5.2, §6 detection

An internet-wide scan of 500k IP addresses from an in-country VPS vantage point found TCP establishment-interception injections on 43,479 addresses (8.7% of scanned), with over 70% concentrated in two Akamai ASes (AS16625 and AS20940). The injection pattern — triggered by the first packet sent to these addresses — is consistent with targeted blocking of domain-fronting proxies hosted on Akamai CDN.

2025-alaraj-iran-refraction §4.1.2 packet-injectionrst-injectionip-blocking

Iran's censorship of refraction-networking proxies (Conjure via Psiphon) is not monolithic: different ISPs independently deploy different techniques and timelines. Over 800 million logged Conjure connections from July 2023–February 2025 across 10+ Iranian ASes show TCI (AS58224, ~33% of traffic) uses packet injection, while MCCI/Hamrah-e Avval (AS197207, ~22%) applies IP-based blocking, and some ASes (Parsonline AS16322, Shatel AS31549) show no proxy blocking at all.

2025-alaraj-iran-refraction §4 rst-injectionip-blockingpacket-injectiondpi

136 Russian government domains (25.09% of 542 accessible ones) blocked access to all tested countries outside Russia, and a further 112 (20.66%) were accessible only from Russian and Kazakhstani vantage points. Geoblocking was implemented via heterogeneous, uncoordinated mechanisms—DNS timeouts, TCP timeouts, HTTP 403 Forbidden responses, and explicit blockpages—across different domains, indicating an ad hoc emergency response with no central policy.

2023-ramesh-network §4.2 ip-blockingdns-poisoningpacket-injection

Data center VPSes predominantly experienced TCP connection timeouts and resets—with the highest-blocking VPS censoring 96.8% of tested domains—while residential ISPs were substantially more likely to inject explicit blockpages citing Roskomnadzor's registry, confirming that blocking mechanism varies significantly by network tier even when blocking rates are similar.

2020-ramesh-decentralized §VI-B rst-injectionip-blockingpacket-injectionkeyword-filtering

Approximately 10% of respondents (n=23) held uncertain or incorrect beliefs about which actor was responsible for a given block, systematically conflating government censorship with geoblocking, paywalls, and platform-side restrictions. This misidentification cascaded into inappropriate tool selection and inaccurate risk assessment: users who could not distinguish state blocking from licensing restrictions could neither choose the right circumvention tool nor accurately gauge the legal jeopardy of accessing the content. Respondents specifically requested a pre-visit blocking-actor classification tool.

2017-gebhart-internet §5.2.3, §5.4.1, §6.2.1 ip-blockingpacket-injection

Users in Thailand relied on incident-driven tool selection—running a fresh Google search for a proxy or VPN each time they hit a block—which the paper identifies as a systematic vulnerability: the Thai Royal Police exploited this pattern after the 2014 coup by linking a phishing application to a government block page, harvesting email addresses and gaining application-level access to Facebook profile information. The paper further notes that orchestrated stricter censorship could drive users to a government-operated malicious tool.

2017-gebhart-internet §5.3.3, §6.2.2 ip-blockingpacket-injection