Port-scanning 10,000 randomly selected non-China IPs found 1,213 (12.1%) acceptable as VoIP dummy hosts (SIP, RTP, RTCP ports not in 'closed' or 'host seems down' states). Of 100 sampled dummy hosts tracked over time, over 90% remained usable for more than 2 hours and over 80% for more than 6 hours; the total usable pool was stable across a 7-day measurement window (Feb. 9–16, 2012).

A censor can compare the predicted AS path from the claimed dummy host to the client against the actual observed ingress entry point of the spoofed downstream traffic; inconsistency reveals the dummy host as a cover. For clients in China Telecom (ASN 4134) and China Unicom (ASN 4837), 100% of 225 candidate dummy hosts passed AS-path consistency filtering; for clients in ASN 4538 only 18.2% (41/225) passed, sharply narrowing the usable pool for smaller ASes.

§5.2.3, Table 2 detection

CensorSpoofer decouples the upstream channel (URLs hidden via steganography in IM/Email) from the downstream channel (web content injected into spoofed UDP/VoIP flows), so the proxy's real IP is never revealed to any user. This asymmetric architecture provides perfect insider-attack resistance: even if all users are compromised, they can only learn cover dummy-host IPs, not the spoofer's address.

§4 defense

The MIT ANA Spoofer project shows that over 400 ASes (22%) and 88.7 million IP addresses (15.7%) permit outbound IP address spoofing, constraining where CensorSpoofer proxy nodes can be deployed. ASes applying ingress/egress filtering make IP-spoofing-based downstream channels infeasible from those locations.

§4.2 deployment

Using G.711 or G.722-64 codecs (64 Kbps downstream), CensorSpoofer clients in China downloaded Wikipedia's HTML file in approximately 6 seconds and the full 160 KB page in approximately 27 seconds; Tor and a proxy-based system (NetShade) were measurably faster. The iLBC codec limits downstream throughput to 15.6 Kbps, and all codecs impose equivalent dummy-traffic cost on the dummy host (G.711 consumes 87.2 Kbps at the dummy host).

§7.2.1, Table 1 evaluation

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §2, §3 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningip-blockingbgp-hijackthrottling

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §6 ip-blockingdns-poisoningthrottling

Brussee measures a systematic pattern of Chinese government websites actively blocking access from outside China (the "reverse Great Firewall"), publishing a CSV dataset of affected domains (available at zenodo.org/records/18172145). The paper frames this outbound geo-blocking as a cybersecurity-motivated practice — Chinese authorities classify foreign access to domestic government infrastructure as an attack surface — distinct from the inbound information control goal of the GFW.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §3, §5 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

Brussee develops a conceptual framework distinguishing two logics of government geo-blocking: (1) information control (blocking inbound foreign content from domestic users) and (2) data sovereignty / attack-surface reduction (blocking outbound access by foreign actors to domestic systems). Chinese government site blocking of external IPs is motivated primarily by the second logic, creating an asymmetric internet topology where CN citizens cannot reach the outside world, and outside actors cannot probe CN government infrastructure.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §2, §4 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

ShieldShare demonstrates that an Android application can route all hotspot-client traffic through a VPN tunnel without root access by using a SOCKS5/HTTP/HTTPS proxy layer between the hotspot and the VPN, with per-client traffic accounting and quota management. The system works because Android's native hotspot does not forward VPN routing tables to connected clients; ShieldShare interposes a proxy that handles this. Released as open-source.

2026-edorh-shieldshare §Abstract ip-blocking