Over 72 days, the authors observed 814,667,299 blog posts (average 11,314,823/day; peak 13,083,878/day). To blacklist all potential MIAB drop points, a censor would need to block 33,361,754 FQDNs (5% of all web servers per Netcraft) or 1,803,345 second-level domains (1.4% of global domain registrations); even a fully-maintained static blacklist retains an 11–12% daily miss ratio as new blogs appear.

Existing censorship-resistant systems share a fundamental vulnerability: they require the user to know a finite set of entry points (bridge addresses, rendezvous points, or ISP-level collaborators) that a censor can enumerate by impersonating a legitimate user. China has blocked the majority of Tor bridges since 2010 and Iran blocked all encrypted traffic in 2012, demonstrating this attack is operationally deployed at scale.

§1 detection

MIAB reduces the bootstrap requirement to only the operator's public key — no pre-shared rendezvous point is needed — by using blog pings as a real-time broadcast discovery channel. Since every blog post on the Internet is a potential drop point, the censor cannot enumerate entry points by posing as a legitimate user, unlike Collage (requires an up-to-date task database) or Telex (requires ISP collaboration).

§3 defense

A single modern machine with a fast domestic Internet connection can process the full blog-ping stream within the 5-minute ping-server release interval: steganographic extraction takes 2m:51s, RSA decryption 2m:35s, and image fetching 4m:17s (parallelizable with extraction), completing under 5 minutes at under 90% CPU. A single machine accommodates 15–20 million posts per day; serving Iran's entire population blogging daily would require only five machines.

§5.1 evaluation

All trained ML classifiers (K-NN, Naive Bayes, ANN, SVM, vote ensemble) performed at near-chance levels when distinguishing RSA-encrypted stego messages from clean photos — best precision 52.05%, best meaningful recall 61.52% (K-NN on clean class). The authors attribute this to embedding only a few hundred bytes into cover photos hundreds of KB in size, with natural image entropy in noisy pixel regions being empirically indistinguishable from RSA-ciphertext statistics.

§5.1, Table 1 defense

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §2, §3 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningip-blockingbgp-hijackthrottling

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §6 ip-blockingdns-poisoningthrottling

Brussee measures a systematic pattern of Chinese government websites actively blocking access from outside China (the "reverse Great Firewall"), publishing a CSV dataset of affected domains (available at zenodo.org/records/18172145). The paper frames this outbound geo-blocking as a cybersecurity-motivated practice — Chinese authorities classify foreign access to domestic government infrastructure as an attack surface — distinct from the inbound information control goal of the GFW.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §3, §5 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

Brussee develops a conceptual framework distinguishing two logics of government geo-blocking: (1) information control (blocking inbound foreign content from domestic users) and (2) data sovereignty / attack-surface reduction (blocking outbound access by foreign actors to domestic systems). Chinese government site blocking of external IPs is motivated primarily by the second logic, creating an asymmetric internet topology where CN citizens cannot reach the outside world, and outside actors cannot probe CN government infrastructure.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §2, §4 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

ShieldShare demonstrates that an Android application can route all hotspot-client traffic through a VPN tunnel without root access by using a SOCKS5/HTTP/HTTPS proxy layer between the hotspot and the VPN, with per-client traffic accounting and quota management. The system works because Android's native hotspot does not forward VPN routing tables to connected clients; ShieldShare interposes a proxy that handles this. Released as open-source.

2026-edorh-shieldshare §Abstract ip-blocking