A controlled survey of 67 technically literate users in Pakistan found that ~45% primarily use public VPN services (Hotspot Shield, Spotflux), 24% use web proxies, and 11% use HTTP proxies such as Ultrasurf to bypass censorship. The survey population skews technical, so real-world adoption of low-friction tools among average users is likely higher.

All 307 blocked websites in Pakistan's test dataset were accessible via CoralCDN (by appending .nyud.net to the hostname) and via Google, Bing, and Internet Archive search-engine caches at the time of the study (2013), representing simple but underutilized bypass vectors. The paper flags these as 'surprisingly unexplored' circumvention options.

§5.2, §5.3 defense

Pakistan's pre-April 2013 ISP-level censorship used DNS injection (spoofed NXDOMAIN) as the primary mechanism, affecting 60.91% of the 307 tested websites on the university network. Critically, the DNS injection extended to public resolvers including Google DNS (8.8.8.8) and Level3 (209.244.0.3), meaning switching to a well-known public resolver does not bypass the block.

§4.1.1 detection

Every website blocked at the DNS level in Pakistan was also blocked by a secondary HTTP-layer mechanism, ruling out the use of alternative DNS resolution (web-based lookup tools or user-generated content hosting DNS records) as a standalone bypass. Multi-IP shared-service sites such as YouTube and Wikipedia were blocked only at the HTTP level, where a Host-header match triggered censorship regardless of the destination URL.

§5.1 detection

In April 2013 Pakistan transitioned from fragmented ISP-level HTTP 302 redirect blocking to centralized IXP-level fake HTTP 200 response injection (attributed to the Canadian firm Netsweeper), resulting in a uniform warning page across all test networks except one still transitioning ISP. Post-transition, 58.30% of the 307 test sites were blocked by DNS and 1.62% by fake HTTP 200 injection; IP and URL-keyword filtering remained at zero.

§4.2 evaluation

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §2, §3 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningip-blockingbgp-hijackthrottling

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §6 ip-blockingdns-poisoningthrottling

DNS censorship of encrypted protocols is inconsistent in both China and Iran. In China, Yandex resolvers are censored only when the SNI extension is present; omitting SNI bypasses censorship for these resolvers. In Iran, DoH requires SNI omission for Quad9, Google, Adguard, CleanBrowsing, and NextDNS resolvers, but works with SNI for Yandex and Cisco resolvers. These inconsistencies suggest resolvers have been accidentally missed by censors, highlighting the value of automated tools that trial all resolver-mode combinations rather than hard-coding a single strategy. The support evaluation found 47 resolvers supporting DoH, 16 supporting DoH3, and only 8 supporting DoQ out of ~65 tested.

2026-lange-towards §6.2, Table 2 dns-poisoningsni-blockingip-blocking

DPYProxy-DNS tested 8 circumvention modes against DNS censorship from vantage points in Iran (AS201295, Mashhad) and China (AS4837, China Unicom). In Iran, DoQ was entirely uncensored even with the SNI extension present; DoH3 worked for all Cloudflare and NextDNS resolvers. Iran's censor operates in-path (not on-path like the GFW), making the "Last Response" mode (wait 3s for the last UDP reply) ineffective in Iran but highly effective in China. Auto-mode averaged 12.32s (median 8.28s) in Iran and 13.78s (median 12.90s) in China to discover a working combination.

2026-lange-towards §6.2, §6.3 dns-poisoningsni-blockingip-blocking

DPYProxy-DNS's automated probe-and-select mode identified a working DNS circumvention in an average of 13.78 seconds (median 12.90s) in China and 12.32 seconds (median 8.28s) in Iran across 100 runs each; best-case startup was 0.32s (China) and 0.47s (Iran) when the first-tried combination succeeded, while worst-case exceeded 30.72s in China and 58.16s in Iran due to the slow Last Response mode (3s fixed wait per attempt) being selected early in the randomized probe order.

2026-niere-dpyproxy-dns §6.3 dns-poisoningsni-blockingip-blocking