Over 60% of the 178 tested target domains host images ≤1 KB (fitting in a single TCP packet), enabling domain-level filtering detection via cross-origin image embedding for more than half of domains; however, Encore can measure fewer than 10% of individual URLs when limiting iframe page loads to 100 KB, confirming that detecting per-URL filtering is an order of magnitude harder than domain-level detection.

Chrome's non-standard behavior of firing an onload event for any HTTP 200 OK response regardless of MIME type—combined with its enforcement of X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff—allows the script tag to probe reachability of arbitrary non-image URLs, a measurement capability unavailable in other browsers that attempt to execute fetched content as JavaScript and thus pose an XSS risk.

§4.3.2, Table 1 evaluation

Applying a regional binomial hypothesis test (p=0.7, significance 0.05) to Encore measurements independently confirmed censorship of youtube.com in Pakistan, Iran, and China, and of twitter.com and facebook.com in China and Iran, validating passive cross-origin measurement against prior independent reports of filtering.

§7.2 evaluation

In 8,573 controlled testbed measurements across image, stylesheet, and script task types, Encore produced zero false negatives and a ~5% false positive rate in India (attributed to unreliable network connectivity rather than filtering), establishing that cross-origin browser probes reliably detect DNS, IP, and HTTP filtering under stable network conditions but require aggregation to control noise.

§7.1 evaluation

Encore collected 141,626 measurements from 88,260 distinct IPs in 170 countries over seven months (May 2014–January 2015) using as few as 17 volunteer webmaster deployments, demonstrating that passive cross-origin measurement can achieve broader geographic vantage-point coverage than custom-software deployments without recruiting individual end-users.

§7 evaluation

The largest single source of censored domains in the GNL is MESA lab's SNI monitoring dataset (E21-SNI-Top200w.txt) containing 57,362 censored domains, and E21-SNI-Top120W-20221020.txt with 36,467 domains—totaling over 93K domains from network tap data alone for a single country (E21 = Ethiopia per InterSecLab attribution). A separate Xinjiang dataset (XJ-CUCC-SNI-Top200w.txt) contains 13,604 domains. These datasets "do not seem to come from popular domain lists, and instead appear to be gathered from network taps," confirming that Geedge builds censorship target lists directly from passive traffic observation.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.2, Table 3 dpisni-blockingmeasurement-platform

Of 6,915,266 domains extracted from the 572 GiB Geedge Networks Leak (GNL), 298,955 censored domains (93.7% of all GNL-censored domains) appear in neither Tranco top-1M nor CitizenLab test lists. Measurements across China (Guangzhou/Nanjing), Myanmar, Pakistan, and Algeria confirmed censorship via DNS injection and SNI-based TLS connection termination. The GNL covers 25–62% of Tranco-censored domains across countries, showing substantial but incomplete overlap. This vendor-side ground truth reveals a censorship surface roughly two orders of magnitude larger than curated academic test lists.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.1, Table 2 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningmeasurement-platform

CensorAlert aggregates censorship signals from heterogeneous open sources — including OONI, Cloudflare Radar, NetBlocks, GitHub Issues of circumvention tools (Hysteria, Xray), Net4People BBS, NTC Party forum, Mastodon, X, Telegram channels, and arXiv — normalizing each item into a common schema preserving timestamp, source, raw data, and provenance with a link to the original content.

2026-zohaib-extended §2 (Data Sources) measurement-platform

Systematic measurement platforms (OONI, Censored Planet, Cloudflare Radar, NetBlocks) have inherent blind spots due to geographic coverage and protocol-specific test constraints; critical censorship discoveries — including GFW fully-encrypted protocol blocking and regional Chinese censorship — were first surfaced by user reports on forums and GitHub issue pages of circumvention tools, not by automated measurement infrastructure.

2026-zohaib-extended §1 measurement-platformfully-encrypted-detect

CensorAlert generates text embeddings (OpenAI text-embedding-3-small) from each item's summary, title, and tags to cluster semantically similar reports within configurable time windows; near-duplicates such as reposts, copied headlines, and translations are collapsed into a single canonical post that preserves all original source URLs and metadata.

2026-zohaib-extended §2 (AI-based Scoring) measurement-platform

CensorAlert's LLM agent scores each ingested item 0–5 on five independent dimensions — credibility, novelty, impact, timeliness, and verifiability — then computes a normalized significance score (0–10) from these components; items are processed every two hours using OpenAI GPT-5 Thinking (hosted on Azure) constrained to return structured JSON output.

2026-zohaib-extended §2 (AI-based Scoring) measurement-platform