The top 10 CDNs collectively host nearly 20% of the Alexa top 10,000 domains (1,967 domains); CloudFlare alone accounts for ~10% of those sites (726 domains) and operates across 75 ASes with 107,008 IP addresses. CDN-hosted domains receive disproportionate interference relative to their 20% share, suggesting censors target popular shared-infrastructure sites as a high-leverage blocking strategy.

Naive interference measurement systematically misclassifies CDN geographic routing as blocking (and vice versa): when China or Russia resolves twitter.com to a non-US IP, a naive detector must decide whether that is a CDN point of presence or interference. Joint iterative analysis of DomainSimilarity and IPTrust scores is required to separate authentic CDN footprints from block-page redirections.

§1, §2.4, §2.4.1 detection

Censors can evade external DNS measurement systems like Satellite by injecting spoofed DNS responses only for resolvers located within the censored country, returning correct answers to external probes. This targeted injection would be 'much less visible to Satellite' while remaining fully effective against in-country users; the paper flags this as a fundamental limitation of single-vantage external measurement.

§4.3 detection

Satellite detected a spike in anomalous DNS resolutions across Iranian ISPs in the second half of 2015, correlating with Iranian authorities' public statements about beginning a 'second phase of filtering,' followed by additional newly inaccessible domains in the lead-up to the February 2016 elections — demonstrating longitudinal DNS measurement can detect and time censor policy escalations.

§4.4, Figure 12 evaluation

Satellite's single-node measurement methodology, probing 1/10th of 12 million discovered open DNS resolvers across 20,000 ASes and 169 countries, detected 4,819 instances of ISP-level DNS hijacking across 117 countries while measuring 10,000 domains with weekly precision from a single external vantage point.

§1 Abstract, §2.2 evaluation

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §2, §3 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningip-blockingbgp-hijackthrottling

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §6 ip-blockingdns-poisoningthrottling

DNS censorship of encrypted protocols is inconsistent in both China and Iran. In China, Yandex resolvers are censored only when the SNI extension is present; omitting SNI bypasses censorship for these resolvers. In Iran, DoH requires SNI omission for Quad9, Google, Adguard, CleanBrowsing, and NextDNS resolvers, but works with SNI for Yandex and Cisco resolvers. These inconsistencies suggest resolvers have been accidentally missed by censors, highlighting the value of automated tools that trial all resolver-mode combinations rather than hard-coding a single strategy. The support evaluation found 47 resolvers supporting DoH, 16 supporting DoH3, and only 8 supporting DoQ out of ~65 tested.

2026-lange-towards §6.2, Table 2 dns-poisoningsni-blockingip-blocking

DPYProxy-DNS tested 8 circumvention modes against DNS censorship from vantage points in Iran (AS201295, Mashhad) and China (AS4837, China Unicom). In Iran, DoQ was entirely uncensored even with the SNI extension present; DoH3 worked for all Cloudflare and NextDNS resolvers. Iran's censor operates in-path (not on-path like the GFW), making the "Last Response" mode (wait 3s for the last UDP reply) ineffective in Iran but highly effective in China. Auto-mode averaged 12.32s (median 8.28s) in Iran and 13.78s (median 12.90s) in China to discover a working combination.

2026-lange-towards §6.2, §6.3 dns-poisoningsni-blockingip-blocking

DPYProxy-DNS's automated probe-and-select mode identified a working DNS circumvention in an average of 13.78 seconds (median 12.90s) in China and 12.32 seconds (median 8.28s) in Iran across 100 runs each; best-case startup was 0.32s (China) and 0.47s (Iran) when the first-tried combination succeeded, while worst-case exceeded 30.72s in China and 58.16s in Iran due to the slow Last Response mode (3s fixed wait per attempt) being selected early in the randomized probe order.

2026-niere-dpyproxy-dns §6.3 dns-poisoningsni-blockingip-blocking