Prior to Bangladesh's 2015 internet ban, only 1 of 21 study participants had prior knowledge of VPN or IP-masking software; during the 26-day ban, VPN knowledge spread virally through social networks until it was described as 'fairly commonplace,' with adoption driven almost entirely by peer-to-peer instruction rather than technical documentation. Users required only procedural knowledge — installation steps and connection — not understanding of VPN mechanics.

Because Bangladesh's ban targeted specific named applications rather than underlying protocols, users successfully substituted functionally equivalent but unlisted apps: 'Banning Facebook, Viber, and Whatsapp for security purposes was not sufficient. For example, I used IMO to operate those apps. So, ultimately, nothing happened.' Authorities responded by expanding the blocklist to cover substitute apps, producing a reactive cat-and-mouse dynamic over the 26-day ban.

Findings – Response to the Ban detection

The Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) directed ISPs to block Facebook, Viber, WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger on November 18, 2015; the ban expanded over 26 days to include Twitter, Skype, IMO, and Instagram, with a coincidental 1-hour complete internet blackout at the outset. Blocking was enforced at the ISP level via written BTRC directives, targeting specific named platforms rather than underlying protocols or ports.

Background deployment

At least one participant was unable to use VPN during Bangladesh's ban because her Windows Phone (Lumia) did not carry VPN client apps in its app store, leaving her 'totally unable to communicate' for the ban's duration despite awareness of the workaround. Device platform and app-store access restrictions created a hard circumvention barrier independent of user intent or technical knowledge.

Findings – Response to the Ban evaluation

During Bangladesh's 2015 internet ban, police conducted roadside stops and physically inspected mobile phones for VPN software, confiscating devices found with VPN installed and asserting VPN use was illegal — despite no official government directive prohibiting VPN. This extra-legal enforcement, carried out by low-ranking constables, created a chilling deterrent effect on circumvention adoption beyond the technical challenge of blocking.

Findings – Response to the Ban policy

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §2, §3 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningip-blockingbgp-hijackthrottling

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §6 ip-blockingdns-poisoningthrottling

Brussee measures a systematic pattern of Chinese government websites actively blocking access from outside China (the "reverse Great Firewall"), publishing a CSV dataset of affected domains (available at zenodo.org/records/18172145). The paper frames this outbound geo-blocking as a cybersecurity-motivated practice — Chinese authorities classify foreign access to domestic government infrastructure as an attack surface — distinct from the inbound information control goal of the GFW.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §3, §5 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

Brussee develops a conceptual framework distinguishing two logics of government geo-blocking: (1) information control (blocking inbound foreign content from domestic users) and (2) data sovereignty / attack-surface reduction (blocking outbound access by foreign actors to domestic systems). Chinese government site blocking of external IPs is motivated primarily by the second logic, creating an asymmetric internet topology where CN citizens cannot reach the outside world, and outside actors cannot probe CN government infrastructure.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §2, §4 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

ShieldShare demonstrates that an Android application can route all hotspot-client traffic through a VPN tunnel without root access by using a SOCKS5/HTTP/HTTPS proxy layer between the hotspot and the VPN, with per-client traffic accounting and quota management. The system works because Android's native hotspot does not forward VPN routing tables to connected clients; ShieldShare interposes a proxy that handles this. Released as open-source.

2026-edorh-shieldshare §Abstract ip-blocking