Aggregate measurements across nearly 180 countries over 17 days found that 60% of reflectors experienced some degree of connectivity disruption; the bias of detected blocks toward Citizen Lab Block List sites held for both inbound and outbound filtering, and temporal variability corroborated documented censorship events around political timelines.
From 2017-pearce-augur — Augur: Internet-Wide Detection of Connectivity Disruptions
· §VI-B
· 2017
· Symposium on Security \& Privacy
Implications
Because 60% of global reflectors show some connectivity disruption, circumvention deployments should assume any new IP will face partial filtering in at least one target country and must implement graceful multi-path fallback from launch rather than treating blocking as an exception.
Temporal monitoring over days reveals censorship onset patterns tied to political events; circumvention infrastructure should integrate automated reachability checks so blocking is detected in near-real-time rather than through lagged user-reported failures.