A simpler but effective complement to IP-list blocking is to block access to I2P's small set of hardcoded reseed servers: first-time users cannot fetch RouterInfos of other peers and are entirely prevented from joining the network. Reseed servers are functionally equivalent to Tor directory authorities as a single point of failure for bootstrapping.

Despite I2P's decentralized design, a censor can block more than 95% of peer IP addresses known to a stable I2P client by operating only 10 routers in the network. The censor learns this by passively monitoring the distributed netDb through injected floodfill and non-floodfill nodes, exploiting the fact that I2P's peer-discovery mechanism exposes the near-complete address space to any sufficiently resourced participant.

Abstract, §6 detection

A blocking rate of more than 70% of I2P peer IP addresses is sufficient to cause significant latency in web browsing activities, while blocking more than 90% of peer IP addresses can make the I2P network unusable. The cost to reach the 95% blocking threshold is operating only 10 censor-controlled routers.

Abstract evaluation

Of approximately 32K active I2P peers observed daily during a three-month measurement (February–April 2018), roughly 6,000 peers came from 30 countries with poor Press Freedom scores (index > 50); China led with more than 2,000 peers, followed by Singapore (~700) and Turkey (~600). This suggests I2P is being used as a Tor/VPN alternative in heavily censored regions, despite China configuring I2P peers to hidden mode by default.

§5.3.2 evaluation

I2P obfuscates payload content to prevent protocol identification, but flow analysis can still fingerprint I2P traffic because the first four handshake messages between I2P routers have fixed lengths of exactly 288, 304, 448, and 48 bytes. The I2P team acknowledged this and was developing an authenticated key agreement protocol to resist automated identification.

§2 detection

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §2, §3 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningip-blockingbgp-hijackthrottling

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §6 ip-blockingdns-poisoningthrottling

Brussee measures a systematic pattern of Chinese government websites actively blocking access from outside China (the "reverse Great Firewall"), publishing a CSV dataset of affected domains (available at zenodo.org/records/18172145). The paper frames this outbound geo-blocking as a cybersecurity-motivated practice — Chinese authorities classify foreign access to domestic government infrastructure as an attack surface — distinct from the inbound information control goal of the GFW.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §3, §5 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

Brussee develops a conceptual framework distinguishing two logics of government geo-blocking: (1) information control (blocking inbound foreign content from domestic users) and (2) data sovereignty / attack-surface reduction (blocking outbound access by foreign actors to domestic systems). Chinese government site blocking of external IPs is motivated primarily by the second logic, creating an asymmetric internet topology where CN citizens cannot reach the outside world, and outside actors cannot probe CN government infrastructure.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §2, §4 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

ShieldShare demonstrates that an Android application can route all hotspot-client traffic through a VPN tunnel without root access by using a SOCKS5/HTTP/HTTPS proxy layer between the hotspot and the VPN, with per-client traffic accounting and quota management. The system works because Android's native hotspot does not forward VPN routing tables to connected clients; ShieldShare interposes a proxy that handles this. Released as open-source.

2026-edorh-shieldshare §Abstract ip-blocking