Sentiment analysis features (Baidu and Boson tools) achieved only 57% accuracy individually; censored posts averaged 53.9% negative sentiment (General model) versus 49.3% for uncensored — a difference too small to be operationally useful — indicating that sentiment polarity does not reliably distinguish censorable content from permitted content on Weibo.

Information Gain feature selection from 408 candidates identified informal language markers (informal, nonflu, swear), Chinese modal and general particles signaling mood and relational framing, and physical-feeling words used metaphorically as the top predictors of censored Weibo content — all with statistically significant differences between censored and uncensored classes.

§5, §6 detection

A Naive Bayes classifier built on 17 LIWC-derived and keyword features achieved 79.34% accuracy (10-fold cross-validation) predicting censorship of Sina Weibo posts, with precision 0.80 and recall 0.85 for the censored class — outperforming all single-domain feature sets including the full 408-feature combination (0.69 accuracy).

§5, Table 1 detection

A 598-term sensitive-keyword blacklist (sourced from Wikipedia and China Digital Times) achieved only 53% classification accuracy on Weibo censorship — below the 66% achieved by punctuation features alone — and appeared in only 31 of 152 uncensored posts versus 60 of 192 censored posts, confirming keywords are not the primary driver of platform censorship decisions.

§4.2, §6, Table 1 detection

When the researchers attempted to use Gemini 2.5 Flash as a third independent LLM judge via its API for evaluating moderation decisions, Gemini automatically blocked all judging attempts citing safety reasons. This occurred even though the research task (judging whether a response is more or less moderated) does not itself produce harmful content. The incident illustrates that LLM safety systems can over-block legitimate research use cases, and that different LLM providers have different thresholds— Claude Haiku 4.5 and GPT-4o completed all judging tasks without safety refusals.

2026-lipphardt-dual §3.3.3 ml-classifierkeyword-filtering

Category-level analysis of 100 statements across 5 sensitive content categories found that interface-based moderation gaps vary significantly by topic. Sexuality showed the strongest WebUI/API gap (WebUI 7.0× more likely to be moderated than API per GPT-4o judge for Gemini). Political ideology followed at 2.0×, then hate speech at 1.0×. Miscellaneous offensive topics showed the inverse pattern (API more moderated at 0.3×). Religious content showed WebUI moderation with no API moderation. The pattern suggests public-facing WebUI interfaces prioritize reputational risk management for high-scrutiny categories.

2026-lipphardt-dual §4.5, Figure 8 ml-classifierkeyword-filtering

An empirical study of 100 sensitive statements tested on Gemini (2.5 Flash) and ChatGPT (GPT-5) found that WebUI interfaces are systematically more restrictive than their API counterparts. According to GPT-4o judge: WebUI was moderated 18% of the time vs. 9% (Gemini API) and 13% (ChatGPT API). DeBERTa classifier found 82% of WebUI responses moderated vs. 58% of API responses. The Gemini WebUI:API ratio ranged from 2.0:1 (GPT-4o) to 7.0:1 (Claude), and ChatGPT from 1.4:1 (GPT-4o) to 15.6:1 (Claude). Neither Google nor OpenAI discloses these interface-specific policies.

2026-lipphardt-dual §4.3, Table 2 ml-classifierkeyword-filtering

The paper proposes a black-box methodology for detecting censorship bias in LLMs by comparing responses to identical prompts in Simplified vs. Traditional Chinese — scripts for the same spoken language — controlling for translation quality while exploiting that Simplified Chinese training data is disproportionately sourced from mainland China's censored internet. Each prompt is repeated ten times and scored for similarity to censored text using an XLM-RoBERTa classifier fine-tuned on Baidu Baike (censored) vs. Chinese Wikipedia (uncensored) with scores from 0 to 1.

2024-ahmed-extended §2 / §2.4 keyword-filteringml-classifiermeasurement-platform

Across five popular translation services available in China (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent, Youdao, and Microsoft Bing), researchers discovered 11,634 unique censorship rules in total. Every service — including the American-operated Bing Translate — implemented automatic censorship that silently omits content, with only Alibaba displaying any notification ('Query csi check not pass') to the user.

2024-ruo-lost §6 Results / Table 2 keyword-filteringml-classifier

Evidence from Youdao Translate suggests it deploys a machine-learning or NLP-based classifier alongside keyword rules: measured rules included repeated components (e.g., 螺+螺+螺+螺+螺+螺+蟢+D+哒+大) and nonsensical multi-token sequences that no human rule author would write, yet which consistently triggered censorship. Youdao returned 9,414 unique rules from the general test set — the most of any service — while also producing the most structurally anomalous rule patterns.

2024-ruo-lost §6 Results / §10 Future Work keyword-filteringml-classifier