FINDING · EVALUATION
A game-theoretic optimal censorship strategy — in which coordinated agents maximize a joint utility combining proxy discovery and blocking impact (equation 3, parameterized by ω) — is significantly stronger than both aggressive (immediate block) and conservative (timed-delay) heuristic strategies evaluated in prior work including rBridge; changing ω (surveillance vs. blocking preference) further modulates the damage a censor can inflict on any given distribution profile.
From 2019-nasr-enemy — Enemy At the Gateways: Censorship-Resilient Proxy Distribution Using Game Theory · §VII-C · 2019 · Network and Distributed System Security
Implications
- Evaluate proxy distribution mechanisms against a coordinated, game-theoretic adversary rather than independent or heuristic censors; prior benchmarks against rBridge-style adversaries substantially underestimate real-world censor capability.
- Designs must be robust across both extremes of ω (blocker vs. surveillor) since a sophisticated censor will tune this preference based on operational goals.
Tags
Extracted by claude-sonnet-4-6 — review before relying.