Russia operates the most fragmented ISP-level filtering infrastructure in the dataset: FilterMap detected 41 distinct ISPs deploying blockpage-injecting filters, and 38 out of 49 filter clusters identified by Quack were deployed in Russian ISPs. All 41 Russian blockpages explicitly cited Federal Law as the reason for blocking.

Anonymization and circumvention tools (VPNs, Tor, etc.) are among the three most commonly blocked content categories across all commercial filters surveyed, alongside pornography and gambling. This holds across diverse products including Fortinet, Cisco, and government-deployed firewalls in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.

§V-A-1, Fig. 7 evaluation

FilterMap identified 90 blockpage clusters from 90 vendors and actors across 103 countries using 374 million measurements from ~45,000 vantage points against 18,736 sensitive domains; 87 of these signatures were previously unknown. Commercial filters were detected in 36 out of 48 countries rated 'Not Free' or 'Partly Free' by Freedom House, with Fortinet alone present in at least 60 countries.

§V deployment

In HTTP tests, more than 50% of filter responses that indicated censorship contained an injected HTML blockpage; the remainder used TCP RST injection or connection timeout. In HTTPS measurements, canonical template matching had a failure rate of only 1.9%, and 95% of Hyperquack measurements completed within 3.5 hours across ~45,000 vantage points.

§III-A, §IV evaluation

The Great Firewall of China does not inject blockpages — it resets connections via TCP RST injection — making it invisible to blockpage-based detection systems. In contrast, the Iran firewall accounted for 97.1% of disruptions observed in Iranian vantage points, and the Bahrain and Saudi Arabia firewalls caused 71.2% and 80.2% of disruptions respectively, all using application-layer blockpage injection.

§V-A-2 detection

During the June 2025 shutdown, Iranian authorities blocked international One-Time Password (OTP) SMS delivery, preventing new sign-ins to foreign secure-messaging platforms and VPN services. This forced users toward government-approved domestic platforms that lack security and privacy protections. The blockade of OTPs effectively weaponized account-recovery flows as a secondary shutdown layer, disproportionately affecting users who needed to activate new circumvention tools during the crisis.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement §Human Rights Implications port-blockingdpikeyword-filtering

Input blocking in Chinese LLM services (DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi, Doubao) is overwhelmingly consistent: all four services persistently block the exact same queries across all 5 measurement samples in both Simplified and Traditional Chinese. Output blocking is far less consistent, with only 29 out of 349 output-blocked queries blocked across all 5 samples. Baidu-Chat is exceptional: it performs almost no input blocking but instead relies heavily on post-search and output blocking (78.6% of blocks are output-phase).

2026-ablove-characterizing §VI-B keyword-filteringdpi

TLS connections to blocked services (instagram.com, telegram.org) were terminated by TCP RST immediately after the client's ClientHello, before any certificate exchange, confirming SNI-based DPI that reads the plaintext SNI extension and aborts the handshake. HTTP filtering additionally matched Host headers and URL keywords case-sensitively, with injected HTTP 403 pages or TCP RST responses, and case-change evasions were sometimes effective.

2025-aryapour-stealth-blackout §4.2, §4.3 sni-blockingdpirst-injectionkeyword-filtering

Iran's HTTP censor exhibits several parsing inconsistencies exploitable for evasion: (1) it is case-sensitive and ignores lowercase method variant "gET"; (2) it does not censor the Host header for HTTP version strings "HTTP", "1.1", and "example" (suggests a version regex of HTTP/.*); (3) when the Host header is absent, the path is not censored for versions "HTTP" and "HTTP/1"; (4) the body is never analyzed regardless of version. All HTTP and DNS censorship occurs at the same last-hop border node, suggesting centralized architecture.

2025-lange-i-ra-nconsistencies §3.2, Table 1 dpikeyword-filteringrst-injection

All six Chinese browsers (Baidu Searchbox, UC Browser, QQ Browser, OPPO, Redmi/Mi, VIVO) transmit the full URL of every page visited—including HTTPS pages—along with page titles and search terms out-of-band to vendor servers, entirely bypassing VPN tunnel protection. In five of six cases this data is transmitted with no cryptography or weak cryptography (purely symmetric AES with hardcoded keys, or textbook RSA with a 128-bit modulus factorable in under 3 seconds), making it readable by any on-path actor between the VPN egress and the vendor's servers.

2025-rodriguez-revisiting §4.1 dpikeyword-filtering

All six browsers grant dangerous Android permissions (READ_PHONE_STATE, INTERNET, ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE) to third-party SDKs; built-in phone browsers grant significantly more such permissions than app-store browsers. Baidu Mobile Tongji Analytics SDK—present in all six via Baidu as default search engine—collects IMEI, UUID, CUID, GAID, device MAC, and Bluetooth MAC, creating a persistent cross-app device fingerprint that identifies users across VPN sessions and survives IP changes.

2025-rodriguez-revisiting §4.3 dpikeyword-filtering