Only 11 of 80 tested VPN providers supported IPv6 connectivity; 5 providers — Astrill VPN, Norton Secure VPN, Turbo VPN, SurfEasy VPN, and a university VPN — failed to block IPv6 traffic when the VPN tunnel did not support it, silently leaking all IPv6 data directly to the user's ISP even when IPv4 was fully tunneled.

VPNalyzer is the first study to measure DNS leaks during tunnel failure, discovering that 8 VPN providers — including TunnelBear and Private Internet Access — allow DNS queries to bypass their kill switch or firewall rules, exposing users' ISP IP addresses and queried domain names to their ISP and DNS resolvers outside the tunnel.

§VI-B evaluation

Among 80 tested VPN providers, 26 leaked user traffic during tunnel failure: 18 exhibited a missing or broken kill switch leaking all traffic types, and 8 additional providers leaked only DNS traffic. In a case study of 39 top providers with all security settings explicitly enabled ('custom secure mode'), 10 still leaked traffic, with 6 leaking even with the 'kill switch' feature activated.

§VI-B, §VI-H evaluation

29 of 80 VPN providers — including paid services — configure clients to resolve DNS through third-party public resolvers (Google Public DNS, Cloudflare, OpenDNS, Quad9) rather than provider-operated infrastructure. Three self-hosted solutions (Algo, Streisand, Outline) hardcode public DNS with no easy override, causing connection failures in regions where those services are blocked.

§VI (Fig. 5) evaluation

27 of 80 tested VPN providers had servers within a single AS (AS 9009, M247 Ltd), and VPNalyzer identified 14 providers sharing 4 specific IP blocks within that AS; 2 additional providers shared an IP block in AS 60068 (Datacamp). Such infrastructure concentration enables censors to block multiple VPN products simultaneously with a single IP-range or AS-level rule.

§VI-D evaluation

The largest single source of censored domains in the GNL is MESA lab's SNI monitoring dataset (E21-SNI-Top200w.txt) containing 57,362 censored domains, and E21-SNI-Top120W-20221020.txt with 36,467 domains—totaling over 93K domains from network tap data alone for a single country (E21 = Ethiopia per InterSecLab attribution). A separate Xinjiang dataset (XJ-CUCC-SNI-Top200w.txt) contains 13,604 domains. These datasets "do not seem to come from popular domain lists, and instead appear to be gathered from network taps," confirming that Geedge builds censorship target lists directly from passive traffic observation.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.2, Table 3 dpisni-blockingmeasurement-platform

Of 6,915,266 domains extracted from the 572 GiB Geedge Networks Leak (GNL), 298,955 censored domains (93.7% of all GNL-censored domains) appear in neither Tranco top-1M nor CitizenLab test lists. Measurements across China (Guangzhou/Nanjing), Myanmar, Pakistan, and Algeria confirmed censorship via DNS injection and SNI-based TLS connection termination. The GNL covers 25–62% of Tranco-censored domains across countries, showing substantial but incomplete overlap. This vendor-side ground truth reveals a censorship surface roughly two orders of magnitude larger than curated academic test lists.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.1, Table 2 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningmeasurement-platform

CensorAlert aggregates censorship signals from heterogeneous open sources — including OONI, Cloudflare Radar, NetBlocks, GitHub Issues of circumvention tools (Hysteria, Xray), Net4People BBS, NTC Party forum, Mastodon, X, Telegram channels, and arXiv — normalizing each item into a common schema preserving timestamp, source, raw data, and provenance with a link to the original content.

2026-zohaib-extended §2 (Data Sources) measurement-platform

Systematic measurement platforms (OONI, Censored Planet, Cloudflare Radar, NetBlocks) have inherent blind spots due to geographic coverage and protocol-specific test constraints; critical censorship discoveries — including GFW fully-encrypted protocol blocking and regional Chinese censorship — were first surfaced by user reports on forums and GitHub issue pages of circumvention tools, not by automated measurement infrastructure.

2026-zohaib-extended §1 measurement-platformfully-encrypted-detect

CensorAlert generates text embeddings (OpenAI text-embedding-3-small) from each item's summary, title, and tags to cluster semantically similar reports within configurable time windows; near-duplicates such as reposts, copied headlines, and translations are collapsed into a single canonical post that preserves all original source URLs and metadata.

2026-zohaib-extended §2 (AI-based Scoring) measurement-platform

CensorAlert's LLM agent scores each ingested item 0–5 on five independent dimensions — credibility, novelty, impact, timeliness, and verifiability — then computes a normalized significance score (0–10) from these components; items are processed every two hours using OpenAI GPT-5 Thinking (hosted on Azure) constrained to return structured JSON output.

2026-zohaib-extended §2 (AI-based Scoring) measurement-platform