Among 286 randomly sampled censorship rules across all five services, only one rule targeted erotic content, while the vast majority targeted political dissidents, CCP leaders, Tiananmen Square, Falun Gong, and government criticism. The paper interprets this near-total absence of pornography censorship as evidence that the censors did not anticipate their rules being audited, or are no longer interested in concealing the overtly political agenda of Chinese information control.

Across five popular translation services available in China (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent, Youdao, and Microsoft Bing), researchers discovered 11,634 unique censorship rules in total. Every service — including the American-operated Bing Translate — implemented automatic censorship that silently omits content, with only Alibaba displaying any notification ('Query csi check not pass') to the user.

§6 Results / Table 2 evaluation

Alibaba and Bing Translate scan only the user's input text for censorship triggers, not the translation output, while Baidu and Tencent apply the same censorship rules to both input and output. Youdao censors input and output using different rule sets. Because Chinese-language censorship rules dominate all services' blocklists, users translating from a non-Chinese language into Chinese using Alibaba or Bing experience materially less censorship than users of the other services.

§7 Effect of Translator Output / Table 6 evaluation

On Tencent Translate, 15 distinct representations of Xi Jinping's name — including romanizations (xijinping, XiJinping, XIJINPING, xIDaDa, xidada), character variants (习近平, 习大大, 习主席, 习书记, 习总书记, 近平习, 反习大大), and a romanized reversed form (JinpingXi, jinpingxi) — each triggered censorship of the translator's entire output rather than just the offending sentence. Between 4–5% of Tencent's discovered rules were inconsistently enforced, which the paper attributes to load-balanced servers implementing different rule sets or rapid rule churn.

§6.3 Censorship Behavior / Table 5 detection

Evidence from Youdao Translate suggests it deploys a machine-learning or NLP-based classifier alongside keyword rules: measured rules included repeated components (e.g., 螺+螺+螺+螺+螺+螺+蟢+D+哒+大) and nonsensical multi-token sequences that no human rule author would write, yet which consistently triggered censorship. Youdao returned 9,414 unique rules from the general test set — the most of any service — while also producing the most structurally anomalous rule patterns.

§6 Results / §10 Future Work evaluation

During the June 2025 shutdown, Iranian authorities blocked international One-Time Password (OTP) SMS delivery, preventing new sign-ins to foreign secure-messaging platforms and VPN services. This forced users toward government-approved domestic platforms that lack security and privacy protections. The blockade of OTPs effectively weaponized account-recovery flows as a secondary shutdown layer, disproportionately affecting users who needed to activate new circumvention tools during the crisis.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement §Human Rights Implications port-blockingdpikeyword-filtering

Simple character-level perturbations (English) and homophone substitutions (Chinese), combined with LLM instruction-following prompts directing the model to use word substitutions in its output, successfully bypassed all input and output filters for all 41 input-blocked and 197 output-blocked queries across five major Chinese LLM services (Baidu-Chat, DeepSeek, Doubao, Kimi, Qwen). Every input-blocked query contained at least one keyword combination that alone triggered the filter, confirming keyword-matching rather than semantic classification.

2026-ablove-characterizing §VII-D keyword-filtering

Cross-national experiments conducted from Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan during February 19–24, 2025 found no variance in blocking implementations, event syntax, or server infrastructure across all five Chinese LLM services. Input blocking was enacted identically in all three international locations, and services connected to the exact same server IP addresses globally — Kimi and Baidu-Chat connected to identical IPs and DeepSeek to the same two addresses across all tested locations.

2026-ablove-characterizing §VIII-A keyword-filtering

Input blocking in Chinese LLM services (DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi, Doubao) is overwhelmingly consistent: all four services persistently block the exact same queries across all 5 measurement samples in both Simplified and Traditional Chinese. Output blocking is far less consistent, with only 29 out of 349 output-blocked queries blocked across all 5 samples. Baidu-Chat is exceptional: it performs almost no input blocking but instead relies heavily on post-search and output blocking (78.6% of blocks are output-phase).

2026-ablove-characterizing §VI-B keyword-filteringdpi

DeepSeek, Kimi, and Doubao all transmit analytics logs to the same Autonomous System (AS24429, Zhejiang Taobao Network Co., Ltd., a ByteDance/Volcengine subsidiary), with one monitoring endpoint IP directly overlapping between DeepSeek and Doubao. Additionally, all four non-Qwen services maintain connections with servers physically located in China throughout the chat session, transmitting user IDs, session IDs, viewport data, language preferences, and in Baidu-Chat's case, the full query text via URL-encoded CAPTCHA requests.

2026-ablove-characterizing §VI-D keyword-filtering

All five Chinese LLM services transmit partial or complete responses to the client machine even when output blocking is triggered, representing a major information leak. For DeepSeek and Qwen, truncated blocked responses are on average close in token length to full successful responses. For Baidu-Chat, the complete response is transmitted to the client but only partially rendered in the browser UI, with only a word or two visible on screen.

2026-ablove-characterizing §VI-C keyword-filtering