Iran's DNS censor injects a correct, static IP address for 385 domains across 10 groups — including 372 Google-related domains (resolving to 216.239.38.120), 2 Bing domains, 2 DuckDuckGo domains, Yandex, CIA, MI5, and Mossad. This previously unreported behavior likely enables surveillance (routing traffic to a controlled IP) or rapid follow-on blocking (nullrouting the injected static IP is cheaper than maintaining DPI rules per domain).

Iran's DNS censor now injects two distinct block-page IPs: 10.10.34.36 (≈87% of 47,633 censored domains) and 10.10.34.34 (≈13%). Both originate from the same network node at Iran's border. Prior research (Aryan et al. 2013) described only 10.10.34.34. The IP injected correlates strongly with the HTTP censorship method applied: domains with 10.10.34.34 in DNS receive TCP RST via HTTP (86.8% of RST cases), while domains with 10.10.34.36 in DNS receive HTTP block pages (84.6% of block-page cases).

§3.1, Table 2 detection

Iran's HTTP censor exhibits several parsing inconsistencies exploitable for evasion: (1) it is case-sensitive and ignores lowercase method variant "gET"; (2) it does not censor the Host header for HTTP version strings "HTTP", "1.1", and "example" (suggests a version regex of HTTP/.*); (3) when the Host header is absent, the path is not censored for versions "HTTP" and "HTTP/1"; (4) the body is never analyzed regardless of version. All HTTP and DNS censorship occurs at the same last-hop border node, suggesting centralized architecture.

§3.2, Table 1 detection

Iran's DNS censor temporarily null-routed all DNS requests containing the string "wpad" at any position, including benign domains like wpad.net, showpad.com, and meowpad.me. The overblocking was no longer reproducible at the time of publication, suggesting a censor configuration error later corrected. The affected domains are unrelated to proxy auto-discovery in most cases, indicating a substring-match rule without context.

§3.1 detection

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

Chinese users treat full proxy/VPN (Shadowsocks, V2Ray/Clash, commercial VPNs) as the '终极大杀器' (ultimate solution) for bypassing GitHub DNS poisoning, implying that lighter-weight DNS-only fixes fail in some network environments where the censor adds firewall-layer blocking beyond DNS.

2026-anon-6-github-dns §3 使用代理或 VPN dns-poisoningip-blocking

Rule-based proxy tools (Clash, Shadowsocks, V2Ray) are documented as the most reliable solution for accessing GitHub from China, with split-tunneling rules routing only GitHub traffic through the proxy while keeping domestic traffic on the direct path. Git command-line tools require explicit proxy configuration (git config --global http.proxy http://127.0.0.1:7890) to route clone/push operations, as they do not inherit system proxy settings automatically.

2026-anon-github-2026-6-dns §方法二 dns-poisoningip-blocking

The GFW blocks GitHub via DNS poisoning across at least four domains — github.com, assets-cdn.github.com, github.global.ssl.fastly.net, and raw.githubusercontent.com — causing connection timeouts and page-load failures for mainland China users. The block is persistent as of February 2026, affecting both browser access and command-line git operations.

2026-anon-github-2026-6-dns Introduction / §方法一 dns-poisoningip-blocking

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §2, §3 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningip-blockingbgp-hijackthrottling

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §6 ip-blockingdns-poisoningthrottling