At operationally realistic base rates—1 million connection pairs per hour with only 10 true stepping-stone chains—a detector with a 1% FPR generates approximately 10,000 false alarms per hour while correctly flagging all 10 intrusions, making classical statistical methods (which cannot reach FPR ≪ 10⁻²) operationally unusable; deep learning methods must target FPR ≤ 10⁻³ to be viable.
From 2026-mathews-tracing-chain-deep — Tracing the Chain: Deep Learning for Stepping-Stone Intrusion Detection
· §I
· 2026
· arXiv preprint
Implications
Circumvention systems that generate a high volume of innocuous background connections can exploit base-rate effects to push any correlation attack's operational FPR above its usability threshold, making correlation-based deanonymization impractical even at high TPR.
FPR ≤ 10⁻³ is the practical operational ceiling for adversarial flow correlation at scale; designs that force an attacker above this threshold—through cover traffic volume or timing noise—are effectively correlation-resistant in real deployments.