Internet is completely blocked in Iran (2025-06-17 to 2025-06-26)

Iranian censors actively detected and blocked circumvention proxies in real time during the June 2025 shutdown: MTProto proxies, v2ray tunnels (VLESS and VMESS variants), and Tor bridges using both Snowflake and obfs4 all experienced mixed or degraded success as proxies were identified and blocked.

Abstract / community testing thread detection active-probingdpifully-encrypted-detect ir

The June 2025 Iran shutdown lasted 10 days (June 17–26) and generated real-time community measurement via IODA and crowdsourced circumvention testing, establishing this event as primary-source documentation of simultaneous carrier-level BGP suppression and application-layer proxy blocking—a dual-layer shutdown strategy distinct from typical content-level filtering.

Issue metadata / abstract evaluation asn-blackholingactive-probingip-blocking ir

Iran implemented a near-complete internet shutdown from June 17–26, 2025 using selective IP-based whitelisting: api.github.com and api.google.com remained accessible while the general internet was blocked. IODA measurements confirmed that ASes 44244 (IranCell) and 57218 (RighTel)—the two largest mobile carriers—were nearly unreachable for the duration.

Issue body / abstract deployment ip-blockingasn-blackholing ir

During Iran's June 2025 shutdown, early reports indicated TCP connections were broadly blocked while UDP-based proxies (Telegram MTProto over UDP) could still establish sessions, suggesting the initial blocking rule targeted TCP at the transport layer rather than applying protocol-agnostic packet filtering.

Issue body (Edit1 / initial reports) evaluation port-blockingdpi ir