FINDING · DETECTION
In the standard redirect design the cooperating proxy's IP address or domain name appears in plaintext HTTP redirect responses, because the censored client cannot present a valid TLS certificate to the OSS and must use plain HTTP. A censor inspecting OSS-bound traffic can extract the proxy address from the Location header or URL query parameters. The no-redirect variant (client and server each initiate single scans of each other) eliminates this leakage at the cost of higher latency and server-side OSS enumeration.
From 2013-fifield-oss — OSS: Using Online Scanning Services for Censorship Circumvention · §7 · 2013 · Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium
Implications
- Obfuscate the proxy address in OSS URLs using JavaScript-generated values or URL-aliasing (multiple domain aliases, URL shorteners with parameter passthrough) to force the censor to execute JavaScript to locate the blocked endpoint.
- Consider a no-redirect single-scan design when proxy address confidentiality is the primary threat, accepting the tradeoff of increased latency and server-side OSS management complexity.
Tags
Extracted by claude-sonnet-4-6 — review before relying.