OSS throughput varies from 250 B/s (vURL/HTTP-302) to 265 KB/s (PDFmyURL/JavaScript-onload). High-rate OSSes—Dr.Web at 20 KB/s, GoMo at 22–175 KB/s, PDFmyURL at 160–265 KB/s—support bulk bidirectional transfer; low-rate OSSes (AdSense 500 B/s, vURL 250 B/s) are suited only for rendezvous. Concurrent streams scale linearly (2× aggregate throughput) for all tested OSSes except AdSense, which rate-limits per source IP.

The bulk-transfer mode requires both the censored client and the cooperating proxy to accept incoming TCP connections, rendering it unusable for clients behind NAT without port-forwarding capability. Rendezvous mode is unaffected because it only requires the client to send a single outbound request. The authors note that many real-world residential users are behind NAT, limiting practical deployment of the bidirectional channel.

§6 evaluation

OSS operators—not the censor—are the primary abuse-detection risk for high-bandwidth use. PDFmyURL's published policy blocks clients making more than 100 requests in 2 hours that cumulatively consume more than 1000 seconds of server CPU and more than 10% of CPU resources. The authors were blocked by PDFmyURL and Twitter during high-bandwidth tests, suggesting that covert use must stay well below these thresholds.

§6.2 evaluation

Online scanning services span security scanners, ad networks (Google AdSense), web diagnostics, and link shorteners—categories economically important enough that blocking them wholesale causes severe collateral damage. The paper identifies five broad OSS categories with dozens of providers, and notes that translation services, photo printers, RSS aggregators, and image hosts are additional unexplored candidates, making exhaustive enumeration by a censor infeasible.

§2, §3, §9 defense

In the standard redirect design the cooperating proxy's IP address or domain name appears in plaintext HTTP redirect responses, because the censored client cannot present a valid TLS certificate to the OSS and must use plain HTTP. A censor inspecting OSS-bound traffic can extract the proxy address from the Location header or URL query parameters. The no-redirect variant (client and server each initiate single scans of each other) eliminates this leakage at the cost of higher latency and server-side OSS enumeration.

§7 detection

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §2, §3 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningip-blockingbgp-hijackthrottling

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §6 ip-blockingdns-poisoningthrottling

Brussee measures a systematic pattern of Chinese government websites actively blocking access from outside China (the "reverse Great Firewall"), publishing a CSV dataset of affected domains (available at zenodo.org/records/18172145). The paper frames this outbound geo-blocking as a cybersecurity-motivated practice — Chinese authorities classify foreign access to domestic government infrastructure as an attack surface — distinct from the inbound information control goal of the GFW.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §3, §5 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

Brussee develops a conceptual framework distinguishing two logics of government geo-blocking: (1) information control (blocking inbound foreign content from domestic users) and (2) data sovereignty / attack-surface reduction (blocking outbound access by foreign actors to domestic systems). Chinese government site blocking of external IPs is motivated primarily by the second logic, creating an asymmetric internet topology where CN citizens cannot reach the outside world, and outside actors cannot probe CN government infrastructure.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §2, §4 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

ShieldShare demonstrates that an Android application can route all hotspot-client traffic through a VPN tunnel without root access by using a SOCKS5/HTTP/HTTPS proxy layer between the hotspot and the VPN, with per-client traffic accounting and quota management. The system works because Android's native hotspot does not forward VPN routing tables to connected clients; ShieldShare interposes a proxy that handles this. Released as open-source.

2026-edorh-shieldshare §Abstract ip-blocking