In a 140-hour measurement, requests forwarded into a 10-node Darknet connected to the Opennet by a single bridge link succeeded only 0.08% of the time, versus 8.46% for Opennet-forwarded requests — a ~100× failure-rate gap caused by ID-space isolation between the two overlay segments.

An 8-week measurement in June–August 2012 discovered 58,571 unique Freenet installations across 102,376 distinct IP addresses; approximately 25% were in the US and 12.5% in Germany, with Europe and North America collectively representing the vast majority — users from countries typically associated with Internet censorship were a small minority.

§5.1 evaluation

Freenet's deployed Opennet topology uses uniformly random long-range contacts rather than Kleinberg-optimal distance-proportional selection, yielding an average routing length of 37.17 hops in simulation; adopting a 1/d distance distribution (r=1) reduces this to fewer than 13 hops — a 2.9× improvement achievable via a Kademlia-style bucket system.

§4.2 evaluation

Freenet users exhibit a median session length of 95–99 minutes (p=0.975–0.99), substantially longer than all measured P2P file-sharing systems (1–60 minutes for Napster, Gnutella, FastTrack, Overnet, BitTorrent, KAD); ~2% of sessions exceeded 100 hours, and the distribution is best modeled by a lognormal fit (residual error 0.019) rather than Weibull or exponential.

§5.2 evaluation

The FNPProbeRequest message, designed to return location and uptime of a node sampled via an 18-hop Metropolis-Hastings random walk, can be used to reliably track individual node online times — capturing >98% of online nodes per sampling interval — enabling intersection attacks on anonymity even though it cannot target a specific node by design.

§5.2 detection

The largest single source of censored domains in the GNL is MESA lab's SNI monitoring dataset (E21-SNI-Top200w.txt) containing 57,362 censored domains, and E21-SNI-Top120W-20221020.txt with 36,467 domains—totaling over 93K domains from network tap data alone for a single country (E21 = Ethiopia per InterSecLab attribution). A separate Xinjiang dataset (XJ-CUCC-SNI-Top200w.txt) contains 13,604 domains. These datasets "do not seem to come from popular domain lists, and instead appear to be gathered from network taps," confirming that Geedge builds censorship target lists directly from passive traffic observation.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.2, Table 3 dpisni-blockingmeasurement-platform

Of 6,915,266 domains extracted from the 572 GiB Geedge Networks Leak (GNL), 298,955 censored domains (93.7% of all GNL-censored domains) appear in neither Tranco top-1M nor CitizenLab test lists. Measurements across China (Guangzhou/Nanjing), Myanmar, Pakistan, and Algeria confirmed censorship via DNS injection and SNI-based TLS connection termination. The GNL covers 25–62% of Tranco-censored domains across countries, showing substantial but incomplete overlap. This vendor-side ground truth reveals a censorship surface roughly two orders of magnitude larger than curated academic test lists.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.1, Table 2 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningmeasurement-platform

CensorAlert aggregates censorship signals from heterogeneous open sources — including OONI, Cloudflare Radar, NetBlocks, GitHub Issues of circumvention tools (Hysteria, Xray), Net4People BBS, NTC Party forum, Mastodon, X, Telegram channels, and arXiv — normalizing each item into a common schema preserving timestamp, source, raw data, and provenance with a link to the original content.

2026-zohaib-extended §2 (Data Sources) measurement-platform

Systematic measurement platforms (OONI, Censored Planet, Cloudflare Radar, NetBlocks) have inherent blind spots due to geographic coverage and protocol-specific test constraints; critical censorship discoveries — including GFW fully-encrypted protocol blocking and regional Chinese censorship — were first surfaced by user reports on forums and GitHub issue pages of circumvention tools, not by automated measurement infrastructure.

2026-zohaib-extended §1 measurement-platformfully-encrypted-detect

CensorAlert generates text embeddings (OpenAI text-embedding-3-small) from each item's summary, title, and tags to cluster semantically similar reports within configurable time windows; near-duplicates such as reposts, copied headlines, and translations are collapsed into a single canonical post that preserves all original source URLs and metadata.

2026-zohaib-extended §2 (AI-based Scoring) measurement-platform

CensorAlert's LLM agent scores each ingested item 0–5 on five independent dimensions — credibility, novelty, impact, timeliness, and verifiability — then computes a normalized significance score (0–10) from these components; items are processed every two hours using OpenAI GPT-5 Thinking (hosted on Azure) constrained to return structured JSON output.

2026-zohaib-extended §2 (AI-based Scoring) measurement-platform