The FNPProbeRequest message, designed to return location and uptime of a node sampled via an 18-hop Metropolis-Hastings random walk, can be used to reliably track individual node online times — capturing >98% of online nodes per sampling interval — enabling intersection attacks on anonymity even though it cannot target a specific node by design.

In a 140-hour measurement, requests forwarded into a 10-node Darknet connected to the Opennet by a single bridge link succeeded only 0.08% of the time, versus 8.46% for Opennet-forwarded requests — a ~100× failure-rate gap caused by ID-space isolation between the two overlay segments.

§4.3 evaluation

An 8-week measurement in June–August 2012 discovered 58,571 unique Freenet installations across 102,376 distinct IP addresses; approximately 25% were in the US and 12.5% in Germany, with Europe and North America collectively representing the vast majority — users from countries typically associated with Internet censorship were a small minority.

§5.1 evaluation

Freenet's deployed Opennet topology uses uniformly random long-range contacts rather than Kleinberg-optimal distance-proportional selection, yielding an average routing length of 37.17 hops in simulation; adopting a 1/d distance distribution (r=1) reduces this to fewer than 13 hops — a 2.9× improvement achievable via a Kademlia-style bucket system.

§4.2 evaluation

Freenet users exhibit a median session length of 95–99 minutes (p=0.975–0.99), substantially longer than all measured P2P file-sharing systems (1–60 minutes for Napster, Gnutella, FastTrack, Overnet, BitTorrent, KAD); ~2% of sessions exceeded 100 hours, and the distribution is best modeled by a lognormal fit (residual error 0.019) rather than Weibull or exponential.

§5.2 evaluation

Wrana et al. systematically assess how well existing surveillance and censorship mechanisms can target users of Future Internet Architectures (FIAs) — including NDN, SCION, XIA, and MobilityFirst — finding that DPI and flow-correlation techniques from the current internet map onto FIA traffic with moderate adaptation. The paper identifies that FIA naming/addressing schemes introduce new censorship attack surfaces (e.g., content-name-based filtering in NDN) not present in IP-based architectures.

2025-wrana-sok-surveillance §4, §5 dpiflow-correlationmeasurement-platform

A three-stage detection pipeline exploiting the "dual-role" behavioral fingerprint of single-IP circumvention relays achieved 23.2% recall (96/414 ground-truth relays) with a 0.18% false-positive rate against 97,651 benign TLS servers, for an overall accuracy of 99.5%. The ground-truth set covered OpenVPN, WireGuard, and SOCKS relays identified in a 17 TB single-day backbone trace (WIDE Project, April 9, 2025).

2026-almutairi-server §3.4, Table 1 traffic-shapedpiflow-correlation

Multi-censor simulations show that single-censor-optimized distribution strategies perform suboptimally in realistic multi-region deployments. When two networks have different censor strategies (e.g., one optimal, one zig-zag), the distributor cannot detect that a proxy is blocked until all censors have blocked it; this leaves clients without reachable proxies despite the proxy appearing "available" from the distributor's view. The authors conclude that "single-censor evaluation does not accurately predict more realistic deployment performance." A zig-zag censor in one region with 0.25 weight caused 44.4% collateral damage while reducing proxy lifetime to a median of 4 steps.

2026-fares-game §6, Table 4 traffic-shapeflow-correlation

The zig-zag traffic analysis attack (confirmed supported in Geedge TSG leak) rapidly enumerates all static proxy pools. With ζ_watch ∈ {4, 6} steps and a best-quality classifier (ρ_TP=0.99, ρ_FP=0.001), almost total proxy enumeration and user blockage occurs well before step 300. Even ζ_watch=2 leaves ~50% of users blocked. Collateral damage is high across all settings when ζ_watch ≥ 4: eventually ~50% of innocent servers are also blocked. However, Snowflake-style ephemeral proxies resist zig-zag effectively: reachability remains above 95% after 360 steps because churn prevents the censor from expanding its known proxy set beyond agents' direct assignments.

2026-fares-game §5.1, Fig 3, Fig 4 traffic-shapeflow-correlation

The largest single source of censored domains in the GNL is MESA lab's SNI monitoring dataset (E21-SNI-Top200w.txt) containing 57,362 censored domains, and E21-SNI-Top120W-20221020.txt with 36,467 domains—totaling over 93K domains from network tap data alone for a single country (E21 = Ethiopia per InterSecLab attribution). A separate Xinjiang dataset (XJ-CUCC-SNI-Top200w.txt) contains 13,604 domains. These datasets "do not seem to come from popular domain lists, and instead appear to be gathered from network taps," confirming that Geedge builds censorship target lists directly from passive traffic observation.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.2, Table 3 dpisni-blockingmeasurement-platform

Of 6,915,266 domains extracted from the 572 GiB Geedge Networks Leak (GNL), 298,955 censored domains (93.7% of all GNL-censored domains) appear in neither Tranco top-1M nor CitizenLab test lists. Measurements across China (Guangzhou/Nanjing), Myanmar, Pakistan, and Algeria confirmed censorship via DNS injection and SNI-based TLS connection termination. The GNL covers 25–62% of Tranco-censored domains across countries, showing substantial but incomplete overlap. This vendor-side ground truth reveals a censorship surface roughly two orders of magnitude larger than curated academic test lists.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.1, Table 2 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningmeasurement-platform