Across eight Greek ISPs measured in June–August 2014, DNS hijacking was the dominant blocking method: seven of eight ISPs used it exclusively, while only Vodafone deployed DPI (Bluecoat WebProxy/6.0) for URL-level filtering. Compliance with the EEEP blacklist of 438 entries ranged from 21.91% (Forthnet) to 100% (Cosmote, HOL, OTE), with no ISP exactly matching the regulator's list.
From 2015-ververis-understanding — Understanding Internet Censorship Policy: The Case of Greece
· §4.2, Table 1
· 2015
· Free and Open Communications on the Internet
Implications
Configure circumvention clients to use out-of-band DNS (DoH/DoT/hardcoded IPs) by default, since DNS hijacking is the primary enforcement vector for Greek-style regulatory censorship and is trivially bypassed by any resolver change.
Do not rely solely on domain-level evasion — Vodafone-style URL-exact DPI requires path-level variation or HTTPS to defeat, so proxies should expose HTTPS endpoints even where HTTP is technically sufficient.