FINDING · DEFENSE

In a single-round censorship game the only Nash equilibrium that keeps the channel open requires the circumvention traffic proportion (CTP) satisfy CTP ≤ F, where F = (βant+βbnt)/(αact+αbct+βant+βbnt). In repeated indefinite games a stable equilibrium exists at CTP = Z = (1−p)·CTPmax, where p is the per-round continuation probability, allowing a non-zero proportion of circumvention traffic to flow indefinitely without triggering shutdown.

From 2016-elahi-frameworkA Framework for the Game-theoretic Analysis of Censorship Resistance · §4.1–4.2 · 2016 · Privacy Enhancing Technologies

Implications

Tags

censors
generic
techniques
dpiml-classifier
defenses
meta-resistancemimicry

Extracted by claude-sonnet-4-6 — review before relying.