In a single-round censorship game the only Nash equilibrium that keeps the channel open requires the circumvention traffic proportion (CTP) satisfy CTP ≤ F, where F = (βant+βbnt)/(αact+αbct+βant+βbnt). In repeated indefinite games a stable equilibrium exists at CTP = Z = (1−p)·CTPmax, where p is the per-round continuation probability, allowing a non-zero proportion of circumvention traffic to flow indefinitely without triggering shutdown.
From 2016-elahi-framework — A Framework for the Game-theoretic Analysis of Censorship Resistance
· §4.1–4.2
· 2016
· Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Implications
Calibrate CRS traffic proportions using estimates of the censor's collateral-damage sensitivity (βant) relative to censorship sensitivity (αact) to stay below threshold F and avoid triggering channel shutdown.
In long-running deployments set CTP = (1−p)·CTPmax rather than maximizing throughput greedily; the continuation-probability discount is the correct parameter for sustaining the equilibrium across indefinite play.