Of 229 Thai Internet users surveyed, 63% (n=144) had attempted to circumvent censorship, and of those, roughly 90% (n=132) reported success using VPNs (32.64%), proxies (32.64%), or Tor (23.61%). Failures were isolated to proxies (n=2), VPNs (n=2), and alternative searches (n=3), indicating that existing circumvention tools were technically adequate but that availability and comprehensibility—not raw capability—were the binding constraints on user success.

Approximately 10% of respondents (n=23) held uncertain or incorrect beliefs about which actor was responsible for a given block, systematically conflating government censorship with geoblocking, paywalls, and platform-side restrictions. This misidentification cascaded into inappropriate tool selection and inaccurate risk assessment: users who could not distinguish state blocking from licensing restrictions could neither choose the right circumvention tool nor accurately gauge the legal jeopardy of accessing the content. Respondents specifically requested a pre-visit blocking-actor classification tool.

§5.2.3, §5.4.1, §6.2.1 evaluation

Nearly 70% (n=160) of respondents reported self-censoring online for fear of the law. Frequency of exposure to blocked content was a statistically significant, ordered predictor of self-censorship (Goodman-Kruskal's gamma = 0.421, 95% CI [0.247, 0.595], p < 0.05), with self-censorship increasing monotonically as exposure to blocked content increased. Notably, self-censorship rates did not differ significantly between respondents inside and outside Thailand, suggesting the chilling effect extends beyond the reach of domestic ISP-level blocking.

§5.5.1 evaluation

Users in Thailand relied on incident-driven tool selection—running a fresh Google search for a proxy or VPN each time they hit a block—which the paper identifies as a systematic vulnerability: the Thai Royal Police exploited this pattern after the 2014 coup by linking a phishing application to a government block page, harvesting email addresses and gaining application-level access to Facebook profile information. The paper further notes that orchestrated stricter censorship could drive users to a government-operated malicious tool.

§5.3.3, §6.2.2 detection

Social media—primarily Facebook—was the dominant venue for direct, experienced threats: 9 of 15 respondents who had content blocked reported being censored on Facebook, and respondents observed that government censorship was shifting away from website blocking toward social media surveillance precisely because social media platforms are 'hard to block.' Respondents lacked any effective technical defenses against peer reporting, group-administrator censorship, and intermediary liability; they relied instead on social management strategies such as abbreviating references to royalty, running 'trial posts,' and self-censoring likes and shares.

§5.2.4, §5.3.1, §6.1.1 evaluation

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

IP and port blocking dropped from 30% of countries historically to only 9% during the study period (six countries), with the decline attributed to difficulty maintaining ephemeral blocklists, CDN collateral damage, and IPv6 expansion. Iran is a significant exception: it has implemented port allowlisting — permitting only ports 80, 443, and 53 — on multiple occasions, blocking all other ports entirely.

2023-master-worldwide §4.3, Table 2 ip-blockingport-blocking

Camoufler's blocking-resistance relies on collateral-damage economics: IM platforms had ~2.5 billion active users as of January 2019 (projected >3 billion by 2022) and are embedded in essential business and commercial operations (airline e-tickets, professional collaboration tools). Blocking all IM to disrupt Camoufler would require the censor to harm its own economy; the threat model requires only that the censor permits at least one IM platform, in which case Camoufler remains operational.

2021-sharma-camoufler §3.1, §7 ip-blockingport-blocking

Protozoa uses the economic and social indispensability of popular WebRTC conferencing services as a censorship deterrent: blocking all WebRTC traffic imposes prohibitive collateral damage on legitimate commerce and communication. This 'parasitism' strategy means the circumvention tool inherits the blocking immunity of the carrier without requiring any protocol mimicry at the network level. Protozoa requires only one reachable WebRTC service to function, and Table 3 confirms at least five services remained unblocked in China during testing.

2020-barradas-poking §3, §7.2 ip-blockingport-blocking

GFW blocking was keyed on both IP address and port number, not IP address alone. Bridges with port 22 (SSH) open had that port remain reachable even as other ports on the same IP were blocked, confirming per-(IP, port) tuple granularity in the GFW blocklist.

2016-fifield-censors §4 Results ip-blockingport-blocking

A single undergraduate ported Castle to two closed-source commercial RTS games (each with >8.5 million copies sold, from different studios) in under 6 hours per game using a ~500-LOC Python/AutoHotkey codebase; 17 of the Top 20 best-selling RTS games share the unit-command structure Castle requires, and 11 have community-decoded replay formats, enabling rapid adaptation to new titles.

2016-hahn-games §7, Table 1 ip-blockingport-blocking