Participants spent 64–78% of their total connection time on the progress/waiting screen (not in the configuration UI), and the simulated censorship environment was the dominant predictor of connection time (Kruskal–Wallis χ² = 80.5, df = 2, p < 10⁻¹⁵). In E3, each failed bridge attempt added several minutes of timeout before the user could retry, compounding the overall latency.

In the heavily censored environment (E3), all successful connections used meek domain-fronting bridges (meek-amazon: 11 participants, meek-google: 9, meek-azure: 3); not a single participant successfully connected using flashproxy, fte, fte-ipv6, obfs4, or scramblesuit, despite all being available as built-in options.

§7.3.1, Table 3 evaluation

The authors recommend 'smart automation' for bridge selection: the client first connects via a hard-to-censor bridge, then contacts a central Tor server over that Tor connection to identify the best available bridge for the user's location and network conditions, then reconnects using that bridge — eliminating the manual trial-and-error that caused 79% of attempts to fail. This is contrasted with 'naive automation' (sequential blind retry) which avoids UI friction but wastes time on non-working bridges.

§8 defense

79% of total user attempts (363 of 458) to connect to Tor in simulated censored environments failed. In the most heavily censored condition (E3, requiring a meek or custom bridge), only 50% (10/20) of participants using the original interface connected, and even with the redesigned interface only 68% (13/19) succeeded within 40 minutes.

§7.3, Table 2 evaluation

A redesigned Tor Launcher interface significantly increased success rates (Pearson χ² = 2.808, p < 0.047) and reduced median connection time in E3 from 40:08 to 20:25 (Mann–Whitney Z = −1.84, p < 0.0328, r = 0.172); configuration time also dropped significantly (Z = −3.28, p < 0.0005, r = 0.307). Changes included eliminating yes/no bridge and proxy question screens, adding auto-detection for proxies, consolidating options, and surfacing meek bridges as a fallback recommendation.

§6.2, §7.3.1–7.3.3, Table 2 defense

The June 2025 Iran shutdown—carried out during the Iran-Israel war beginning ~June 19—did not use BGP route withdrawals as in 2019. Instead, authorities applied service-level restrictions at the national border: DNS poisoning of foreign destinations, protocol whitelisting permitting only pre-approved domestic services, and DPI to block circumvention-tool traffic. Iran's international traffic fell roughly 90% while the country's BGP routes remained advertised, making the shutdown invisible to BGP-based monitoring systems. OONI measurement volume, which totalled 121,333 in June 2025, collapsed to under 200 submissions on June 19-20.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement Executive Summary / §2 dpidns-poisoningport-blockingip-blocking

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §2, §3 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningip-blockingbgp-hijackthrottling

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

2026-article19-tightening-the-net §6 ip-blockingdns-poisoningthrottling

Brussee measures a systematic pattern of Chinese government websites actively blocking access from outside China (the "reverse Great Firewall"), publishing a CSV dataset of affected domains (available at zenodo.org/records/18172145). The paper frames this outbound geo-blocking as a cybersecurity-motivated practice — Chinese authorities classify foreign access to domestic government infrastructure as an attack surface — distinct from the inbound information control goal of the GFW.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §3, §5 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

Brussee develops a conceptual framework distinguishing two logics of government geo-blocking: (1) information control (blocking inbound foreign content from domestic users) and (2) data sovereignty / attack-surface reduction (blocking outbound access by foreign actors to domestic systems). Chinese government site blocking of external IPs is motivated primarily by the second logic, creating an asymmetric internet topology where CN citizens cannot reach the outside world, and outside actors cannot probe CN government infrastructure.

2026-brussee-reverse-great-firewall §2, §4 ip-blockingasn-blackholing

ShieldShare demonstrates that an Android application can route all hotspot-client traffic through a VPN tunnel without root access by using a SOCKS5/HTTP/HTTPS proxy layer between the hotspot and the VPN, with per-client traffic accounting and quota management. The system works because Android's native hotspot does not forward VPN routing tables to connected clients; ShieldShare interposes a proxy that handles this. Released as open-source.

2026-edorh-shieldshare §Abstract ip-blocking