DeTor circuits have significantly lower end-to-end RTTs than standard Tor circuits because high-RTT paths cannot satisfy avoidance proofs, effectively self-selecting for shorter routes. Bandwidth distributions are similar to standard Tor. However, intentional packet-delay defenses proposed for Tor (to defeat timing attacks) would increase effective δ and reduce DeTor proof coverage, creating a tension between delay-based anonymity defenses and RTT-based geographic avoidance.
From 2017-li-detor — DeTor: Provably Avoiding Geographic Regions in Tor
· §6.2.3, §6.2.1 (δ discussion)
· 2017
· USENIX Security Symposium
Implications
RTT-based geographic avoidance is incompatible with delay-injection anonymity defenses (WTFPAD, etc.) — deploying both simultaneously degrades avoidance proof coverage; choose one primary defense model.
The latency advantage of DeTor circuits (shorter paths selected) is a secondary benefit but also a potential fingerprint — clients should be aware that DeTor circuits are statistically faster than normal Tor circuits.