Spoofed TCP RST packets with sequence numbers stepped at 60,000-unit intervals sent outside the VPN tunnel can evict a victim's ESTABLISHED session entry (timeout drops from 432,000 s to 10 s in Netfilter pre-patch); approximately 71,000 RST packets suffice and can be sent in seconds on modern hardware. Controlling RST TTL to equal the hop count to the VPN server bypasses the RFC 5961 challenge-ACK countermeasure.

Empirical evaluation against nine major commercial VPN providers found all five tested connection tracking frameworks (Linux Netfilter, FreeBSD PF, IPFW, IPFilter, natd) and eight of nine providers vulnerable to at least one session manipulation attack, resulting in 19 assigned CVEs/CNVDs.

§I, §IV evaluation

DNS hijacking via shared VPN NAT is feasible because the full 16-bit TxID space (up to 65,536 values) can be brute-forced in an average of 4.27 seconds, well within a typical 10-second DNS request timeout; browser DNS cache windows range from 60 seconds (Chrome/Edge) to 660 seconds or more (Firefox), with longer windows enlarging the injection race window.

§III-C, §IV-D, Table I evaluation

A co-tenant attacker sharing the same VPN server can launch a port-exhaustion DoS in an average of 4 seconds with over 90% success rate, inject forged HTTP responses in 64.11 seconds at a 66.7% success rate, and hijack DNS responses at success rates of 20% to 70%.

§I, §IV-B, §IV-C, §IV-D evaluation

When a VPN server uses Port Preservation for NAT, a co-tenant off-path attacker can infer another user's externally mapped source port by sending probe SYN packets with guessed ports through the tunnel and spoofed SYN/ACK verification packets outside the tunnel; confirmation comes from observing which port the VPN server forwards the response to, enabling targeted TCP session hijacking.

§III-B1, §IV-A, Table II detection

Re-testing in 2025 on a Pixel 10 Pro XL running Android 16 with October 2025 security updates confirmed that blind in/on-path VPN inference attacks remain fully viable despite CVE-2019-9461, CVE-2019-14899, and CVE-2024-49734 having been formally closed. All three core attack primitives—VPN-assigned internal IP discovery, active connection inference, and TCP reset injection via sequence/acknowledgment window scanning—succeeded across OpenVPN, WireGuard, and NordLynx.

2026-tolley-architectural §5.1–5.3 traffic-shaperst-injectionactive-probing

Six widely deployed VPN and circumvention tools—OpenVPN, WireGuard/NordLynx, NordWhisper, Orbot (Tor on Android), Lantern, and Psiphon—all failed to block internal IP inference, connection-state detection, and TCP reset injection under identical adversarial conditions on fully patched Android 16. Application-layer obfuscation in Lantern and Psiphon did not prevent TCP-layer disruption; Orbot's VPN-style encapsulation of Tor traffic was bypassed via the same tunnel-level side channels.

2026-tolley-architectural §5.2, §5.4–5.5 traffic-shaperst-injectionactive-probing

The CVE system is structurally incapable of tracking cross-vendor architectural vulnerabilities: in 2019 MITRE correspondence the authors were told CVE identifiers apply only to specific software implementation mistakes and that CVE-2019-14899 'should not have been assigned,' leaving the architectural VPN inference attack surface permanently untracked. Between CVE-2019-14899 (2019) and CVE-2024-49734 (2024), no new CVE was assigned despite continued reporting and confirmed exploitability, creating a five-year gap in the public record during which vendor patch claims went unchallenged.

2026-tolley-architectural §3.1, §4.1, §6.4 traffic-shaperst-injection

The paper proposes an Internet Freedom vulnerability registry with five design principles: persistent cross-vendor tracking under shared identifiers (e.g., IF-ARCH-2025-001) as long as a risk remains reproducible; human-centered impact ratings anchored to harm potential for journalists and dissidents rather than CVSS-style exploitability scores; timestamped re-verification hooks with linked PCAPs and minimal reproduction scripts; a structured media interface to counter vendor narrative capture; and open public APIs for integration into risk dashboards so that users of tools like Orbot or Lantern can directly query their configuration's exposure to known metadata-based attacks.

2026-tolley-architectural §6.1–6.5 traffic-shaperst-injectionactive-probing

The server-side variant of the blind VPN inference attack—where an in/on-path adversary exploits predictable NAT assignment and tunnel routing semantics to inject spoofed packets indistinguishable from legitimate encrypted traffic—has remained unacknowledged and unmitigated across all tested platforms since its concurrent disclosure in 2019. Unlike the client-side variant, which received partial fixes from Google (CVE-2019-9461, CVE-2024-49734) and Apple (iOS 17.2.1), no vendor has proposed a viable remediation or claimed ownership of the server-side attack surface.

2026-tolley-architectural §2.1, §3.1, §3.4 traffic-shaperst-injectionmiddlebox-interference

An internet-wide scan of 500k IP addresses from an in-country VPS vantage point found TCP establishment-interception injections on 43,479 addresses (8.7% of scanned), with over 70% concentrated in two Akamai ASes (AS16625 and AS20940). The injection pattern — triggered by the first packet sent to these addresses — is consistent with targeted blocking of domain-fronting proxies hosted on Akamai CDN.

2025-alaraj-iran-refraction §4.1.2 packet-injectionrst-injectionip-blocking