rst-injection   TCP RST injection

Measurements of TCP RST injectors confirm that GFW II and GFW III consistently yield a seed key k=13, matching TSG's default seed_key parameter in trick_algo_getrandval_with_seed. The probability of sharing TSG's default value of 13 by chance is approximately 10⁻⁴⁴, strongly indicating these GFW components run Geedge Networks TSG code or a close derivative.

2026-ablove-technical-analysis-geedge §6.3, Table 7 deployment

HTTP censorship blockpages in Iran fell into two distinct clusters distinguished by IP TTL values: type NTL1 (TTL 53–55) and type NTE1 (TTL 186–188); TCP RST injections targeting TLS and DNS-over-TCP exhibited the same two TTL ranges. The NTL1 injector was absent on June 11 but present on other days, leading the authors to conclude that an entire injector went offline rather than that a single injection pattern was selectively disabled.

2026-anon-insights-into-iranian §2.2.5 detection

FlowPaint evades all three GFW-style rule-based middlebox configurations — stateful TCP keyword reassembler (Censor A), heuristic header filter dropping flows with TCP data offset ≥ 9 (Censor B), and anti-replay validator caching (SEQ, payload_hash) pairs and injecting bidirectional RSTs on replay detection (Censor C). Geneva's duplicate-packet desynchronization strategy fails against Censor C because its malformed artifacts simultaneously satisfy the anti-replay blocking condition, while FlowPaint succeeds by recalculating checksums and injecting no extra packets.

2026-ling-one-prompt-censorship-evasion §5.2, Table 4 defense

Unlike the Great Firewall of China, Iran's SNI-triggered blocking produces no residual interference: after a TCP RST caused by a sensitive SNI, subsequent connections from the same source IP using benign or randomly generated SNIs proceed normally without additional disruption. This behavior was observed consistently before and after the May 26, 2026 partial restoration.

2026-lunarcanvas-swift-look-into §4.2 detection

Iran layers SNI-based domain blocking on top of its IP allowlist: even source IPs permitted by the allowlist trigger TCP RSTs when a TLS ClientHello contains a sensitive SNI value. Randomly generated, non-existent domain names pass through without triggering resets, confirming the blocking operates as a domain-name blocklist rather than a generic TLS fingerprinting rule. Blocking behavior was highly consistent, with 97.4% of (source IP, SNI) pairs producing identical outcomes across three test repetitions.

2026-lunarcanvas-swift-look-into §4.2 detection

Iran's SNI filtering is applied inconsistently across allowlisted users: among 737 tested allowlisted IP addresses, approximately half experienced no SNI filtering at all and could reach destinations even using previously-reported blocked domains. For IPs subject to filtering, 49.9% of requests containing hrw.org and 50.2% containing tiktok.com triggered RSTs, while only 0.5% of requests with youtube.com were blocked — suggesting differential access policies tied to specific domains and user classes even within the allowlisted population.

2026-lunarcanvas-swift-look-into §4.2 detection

As of June 2026, Iranian DPI blocking timescales are: CDN-fronted VLESS+WebSocket domains blocked within 24 hours; SSH dynamic port forwarding server IPs blocked within 8 hours; Reality and WireGuard connections blocked immediately (seconds) after handshake completion. This graduated timeline suggests separate fast-path (handshake-pattern) and slow-path (domain reputation / traffic accumulation) detection pipelines operating in parallel.

2026-pooribitwise-iran-advanced-dpi Issue body — combined observations evaluation

Iran's censor deploys a two-stage blocking response within 24 hours of domain exposure: DNS hijacking that resolves blocked domains to 10.10.34.34, combined with RST floods when clients connect directly to Cloudflare IPs using the blocked SNI. Both mechanisms activate independently, so DNS-resistant clients are still terminated at the TCP layer.

2026-pooribitwise-iran-advanced-dpi Issue body — The Issue detection

The Reality protocol triggers immediate RST flood responses from Iranian ISP infrastructure at the completion of the TLS handshake, suggesting Iranian DPI has developed a fingerprint or active-probe response specifically targeting Reality's TLS handshake forwarding mechanism as of June 2026.

2026-pooribitwise-iran-advanced-dpi Issue body — Other Observations §2 detection

Re-testing in 2025 on a Pixel 10 Pro XL running Android 16 with October 2025 security updates confirmed that blind in/on-path VPN inference attacks remain fully viable despite CVE-2019-9461, CVE-2019-14899, and CVE-2024-49734 having been formally closed. All three core attack primitives—VPN-assigned internal IP discovery, active connection inference, and TCP reset injection via sequence/acknowledgment window scanning—succeeded across OpenVPN, WireGuard, and NordLynx.

2026-tolley-architectural §5.1–5.3 evaluation

Six widely deployed VPN and circumvention tools—OpenVPN, WireGuard/NordLynx, NordWhisper, Orbot (Tor on Android), Lantern, and Psiphon—all failed to block internal IP inference, connection-state detection, and TCP reset injection under identical adversarial conditions on fully patched Android 16. Application-layer obfuscation in Lantern and Psiphon did not prevent TCP-layer disruption; Orbot's VPN-style encapsulation of Tor traffic was bypassed via the same tunnel-level side channels.

2026-tolley-architectural §5.2, §5.4–5.5 evaluation

The CVE system is structurally incapable of tracking cross-vendor architectural vulnerabilities: in 2019 MITRE correspondence the authors were told CVE identifiers apply only to specific software implementation mistakes and that CVE-2019-14899 'should not have been assigned,' leaving the architectural VPN inference attack surface permanently untracked. Between CVE-2019-14899 (2019) and CVE-2024-49734 (2024), no new CVE was assigned despite continued reporting and confirmed exploitability, creating a five-year gap in the public record during which vendor patch claims went unchallenged.

2026-tolley-architectural §3.1, §4.1, §6.4 policy

The paper proposes an Internet Freedom vulnerability registry with five design principles: persistent cross-vendor tracking under shared identifiers (e.g., IF-ARCH-2025-001) as long as a risk remains reproducible; human-centered impact ratings anchored to harm potential for journalists and dissidents rather than CVSS-style exploitability scores; timestamped re-verification hooks with linked PCAPs and minimal reproduction scripts; a structured media interface to counter vendor narrative capture; and open public APIs for integration into risk dashboards so that users of tools like Orbot or Lantern can directly query their configuration's exposure to known metadata-based attacks.

2026-tolley-architectural §6.1–6.5 policy

The server-side variant of the blind VPN inference attack—where an in/on-path adversary exploits predictable NAT assignment and tunnel routing semantics to inject spoofed packets indistinguishable from legitimate encrypted traffic—has remained unacknowledged and unmitigated across all tested platforms since its concurrent disclosure in 2019. Unlike the client-side variant, which received partial fixes from Google (CVE-2019-9461, CVE-2024-49734) and Apple (iOS 17.2.1), no vendor has proposed a viable remediation or claimed ownership of the server-side attack surface.

2026-tolley-architectural §2.1, §3.1, §3.4 detection

Empirical evaluation against nine major commercial VPN providers found all five tested connection tracking frameworks (Linux Netfilter, FreeBSD PF, IPFW, IPFilter, natd) and eight of nine providers vulnerable to at least one session manipulation attack, resulting in 19 assigned CVEs/CNVDs.

2026-yang-invisible-adversaries-systematic §I, §IV evaluation

A co-tenant attacker sharing the same VPN server can launch a port-exhaustion DoS in an average of 4 seconds with over 90% success rate, inject forged HTTP responses in 64.11 seconds at a 66.7% success rate, and hijack DNS responses at success rates of 20% to 70%.

2026-yang-invisible-adversaries-systematic §I, §IV-B, §IV-C, §IV-D evaluation

When a VPN server uses Port Preservation for NAT, a co-tenant off-path attacker can infer another user's externally mapped source port by sending probe SYN packets with guessed ports through the tunnel and spoofed SYN/ACK verification packets outside the tunnel; confirmation comes from observing which port the VPN server forwards the response to, enabling targeted TCP session hijacking.

2026-yang-invisible-adversaries-systematic §III-B1, §IV-A, Table II detection

Spoofed TCP RST packets with sequence numbers stepped at 60,000-unit intervals sent outside the VPN tunnel can evict a victim's ESTABLISHED session entry (timeout drops from 432,000 s to 10 s in Netfilter pre-patch); approximately 71,000 RST packets suffice and can be sent in seconds on modern hardware. Controlling RST TTL to equal the hop count to the VPN server bypasses the RFC 5961 challenge-ACK countermeasure.

2026-yang-invisible-adversaries-systematic §III-B2, §IV-A detection

An internet-wide scan of 500k IP addresses from an in-country VPS vantage point found TCP establishment-interception injections on 43,479 addresses (8.7% of scanned), with over 70% concentrated in two Akamai ASes (AS16625 and AS20940). The injection pattern — triggered by the first packet sent to these addresses — is consistent with targeted blocking of domain-fronting proxies hosted on Akamai CDN.

2025-alaraj-iran-refraction §4.1.2 detection

Iran's censorship of refraction-networking proxies (Conjure via Psiphon) is not monolithic: different ISPs independently deploy different techniques and timelines. Over 800 million logged Conjure connections from July 2023–February 2025 across 10+ Iranian ASes show TCI (AS58224, ~33% of traffic) uses packet injection, while MCCI/Hamrah-e Avval (AS197207, ~22%) applies IP-based blocking, and some ASes (Parsonline AS16322, Shatel AS31549) show no proxy blocking at all.

2025-alaraj-iran-refraction §4 detection

TTL-based path analysis showed that all censorship actions (DNS poisoning, HTTP injection, TLS resets) in the June 2025 shutdown occurred at the same network hop across all tested ISPs, indicating a single centralized national border gateway—likely TCI AS gateways—rather than per-ISP enforcement. Global BGP announcements were kept intact throughout, making the shutdown invisible to routing monitors while domestic connectivity collapsed.

2025-aryapour-stealth-blackout §4.5 deployment

TLS connections to blocked services (instagram.com, telegram.org) were terminated by TCP RST immediately after the client's ClientHello, before any certificate exchange, confirming SNI-based DPI that reads the plaintext SNI extension and aborts the handshake. HTTP filtering additionally matched Host headers and URL keywords case-sensitively, with injected HTTP 403 pages or TCP RST responses, and case-change evasions were sometimes effective.

2025-aryapour-stealth-blackout §4.2, §4.3 detection

The August 20, 2025 unconditional RST event revealed an asymmetry in the GFW's triggering mechanism: for traffic originating inside China, both the client SYN and the server SYN+ACK each independently triggered three injected RST+ACK packets (six total per connection). For traffic to China from outside, only the Chinese server's SYN+ACK triggered RSTs — the foreign client's SYN alone was insufficient. This asymmetry implies the responsible device observed the SYN+ACK from the Chinese server as the trigger condition, not a port-match rule on the SYN.

2025-gfw-port443-rst §2.1, §2.2 detection

On August 20, 2025 from approximately 00:34 to 01:48 Beijing Time (74 minutes), the GFW unconditionally injected TCP RST+ACK packets on all port 443 traffic, regardless of payload content, disrupting all TCP/443 connections between China and the rest of the world. The injected packets came in triples with incrementally increasing TTL and window size fields — a fingerprint that does not match any previously catalogued GFW device — indicating either a new device or a known device in a novel or misconfigured state. The blocking was port-443-specific: ports 22, 80, 8443, and others were unaffected during the same window.

2025-gfw-port443-rst §1, §2.3, §3 detection

Iran's DNS censor now injects two distinct block-page IPs: 10.10.34.36 (≈87% of 47,633 censored domains) and 10.10.34.34 (≈13%). Both originate from the same network node at Iran's border. Prior research (Aryan et al. 2013) described only 10.10.34.34. The IP injected correlates strongly with the HTTP censorship method applied: domains with 10.10.34.34 in DNS receive TCP RST via HTTP (86.8% of RST cases), while domains with 10.10.34.36 in DNS receive HTTP block pages (84.6% of block-page cases).

2025-lange-i-ra-nconsistencies §3.1, Table 2 detection

Iran's HTTP censor exhibits several parsing inconsistencies exploitable for evasion: (1) it is case-sensitive and ignores lowercase method variant "gET"; (2) it does not censor the Host header for HTTP version strings "HTTP", "1.1", and "example" (suggests a version regex of HTTP/.*); (3) when the Host header is absent, the path is not censored for versions "HTTP" and "HTTP/1"; (4) the body is never analyzed regardless of version. All HTTP and DNS censorship occurs at the same last-hop border node, suggesting centralized architecture.

2025-lange-i-ra-nconsistencies §3.2, Table 1 detection

In China, multiple URLs show 100% failure rates across 3–7 ASNs with near-zero confirmed blockpage rates (e.g., hkleaks.ru, blockdx.co, libgen.space each at 100% failure, avg_confirmed ≈ 0), indicating that China increasingly uses non-blockpage mechanisms — connection drops, TCP anomalies — that evade blockpage-based detection while achieving complete access denial.

2025-lipphardt-1-800-censorship §4.4, Table 4 evaluation

Neither China nor Iran directly block ECH ClientHello messages; instead both effectively prevent ECH by censoring encrypted DNS resolvers. China blocks Cloudflare's DoH/DoT resolver (mozilla.cloudflare-dns.com) via SNI-based blocking in TLS and QUIC, causing residual censorship of up to 360 and 180 seconds respectively. Iran blocks both Cloudflare and NextDNS DoH hostnames via DNS block-page injection, TLS TCP RST, and HTTP block pages. Iran cannot analyze QUIC, so DoQ is uncensored and enables ECH in Iran. China's NextDNS IP blackholing affected only one of two resolved IPs, leaving an uncensored path.

2025-niere-encrypted §5, Table 1, Figure 5 detection

Russian TSPU devices directly block ECH by dropping ClientHello messages that contain both an ECH extension and the outer SNI hostname "cloudflare-ech.com" — the static outer SNI Cloudflare advertises in all its ECH configurations. Blocking affects both TLS and QUIC. ECH connections to servers with Cloudflare ECH support but outside Cloudflare's official IP ranges are NOT blocked. TCP segmentation alone or TLS record fragmentation alone did NOT bypass TSPU ECH blocking, but combining both techniques did circumvent it. TSPU has also added TCP reassembly capabilities that defeat previously effective fragmentation-only bypasses.

2025-niere-encrypted §5, Figure 5 detection

Six injected IPv4 addresses (8.7.198.46, 39.109.122.128, 46.82.174.69, 59.24.3.174, 93.46.8.90, 103.97.3.19) accept TCP SYN→SYN+ACK from within China but immediately reply RST when the client sends application data (PSH flag). These hosts mirror IPID values from probe packets, show no response from outside China, and appear to operate statelessly — suggesting GFW-controlled surveillance infrastructure that collects connection metadata without revealing itself.

2025-sheffey-extended §2.2.2 detection

The GFI's HTTP and HTTPS filters are now stateful (requiring initial SYN packet with matching sequence numbers) and have been activated on all TCP ports—not only standard ports 80 and 443 as reported by prior studies. This is a significant departure from previous work that found stateless HTTP/HTTPS blocking limited to standard ports. The HTTP filter injects a 403 Forbidden blockpage (not RST packets as used by the GFW), while HTTPS injects a single RST+ACK packet. The GFI also exhibits TCP non-compliance (not requiring a full three-way handshake to trigger filtering), enabling outside-in measurement without in-country servers.

2025-tai-irblock §2.1, §3.2 detection

China's Great Firewall showed anomalous inconsistency: 13 test vectors produced mixed outcomes—TCP RST injection on some executions and a clean server response on others—with circumvention rates between 10% and 35% across 100 executions per vector. The authors attribute this to heterogeneous GFW infrastructure components applying different HTTP parsing logic, a departure from the GFW's usual consistency.

2024-m-ller-turning §5.2 detection

Stateful firewalls used as censorship middleboxes exhibit counter-intuitive implementation behaviors: FW-3 forwards ACK packets before a TCP handshake is initiated, and FW-1 actively spoofs RST packets in response to unsolicited traffic to thwart evasion attempts. These vendor-specific quirks create or close evasion opportunities that are invisible to rule-verification tools and not predictable from policy documentation alone.

2024-moon-pryde §1 Introduction, Findings 3–4 detection

TSPU devices perform in-line packet manipulation — they can inject RST packets, drop traffic, and throttle connections — rather than routing traffic to an out-of-band sniffer that votes to block. The inline placement means TSPU can act on the first-packet payload and impose latency on all matching flows, not only on those selected by sampling. Blocking decisions are therefore applied with high recall at the ISP edge, and circumvention tools that rely on short observation windows (e.g. only obfuscating the first N bytes) are vulnerable to continued inline inspection of subsequent traffic.

2024-xue-tspu-russia §3–§4 detection

DeResistor-generated evasion strategies achieve an overall success rate of up to 98.61% against GFW (across vantage points in Qingdao, Shanghai, and Beijing) for the best strategy, and 100% in both India (Bangalore) and Kazakhstan (Oral) for the top-performing strategy, while standalone Geneva strategies tested in the same environment achieve comparable or slightly lower rates on some censors but are blocked at the IP level before training completes.

2023-amich-deresistor §6.3, Table 2 evaluation

From September 5–20, 2023, the GFW blocked 1.1.1.1:443 via TCP RST injection; starting October 1, 2023, the mechanism shifted to HTTP packet injection on port 80, while port 443 behavior became inconsistent across ASes — from one AS45090 vantage point, HTTPS connections to 1.1.1.1 still succeeded while other observers confirmed RST injection.

2023-gfw-blocking-1111 Major observations detection

In Brunei, censorship is confined to AS10094, which serves approximately 70% of the country's Internet users. The censor injects RST packets bearing a distinctive fingerprint — the censored query's IP ID field — in response to HTTP requests containing censored Host headers, and censors on all ports without residual censorship. A SYN followed immediately by a PSH+ACK with a censored payload is sufficient to trigger blocking without a completed TCP handshake.

2023-nourin-detecting §3 detection

Censoring middleboxes' TCP non-compliance — specifically, their willingness to censor bidirectionally without completing the three-way handshake — enables external vantage points outside a censoring country to trigger and measure censorship without any local endpoint participation. The approach requires only a confirmed censored domain per AS, evidence of bidirectional censorship, and minimal residual censorship.

2023-nourin-detecting §2 evaluation

The endpoint-free methodology fails when bidirectional censorship is absent or when residual censorship is pervasive: experiments in Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Myanmar, and Kyrgyzstan could not confirm bidirectional censorship, rendering automated triggering-and-measurement inapplicable. Residual censorship causes false positives by making innocuous domains appear blocked following a censored query.

2023-nourin-detecting §3 evaluation

Tajikistan routes virtually all national egress and ingress traffic through a single state-run AS (AS51346, Tojiktelecom) under a 2016 national decree, creating a centralized chokepoint. The censor injects RST+ACK packets with a unique 22-byte all-zero payload, censors on all ports, and requires two PSH+ACK packets containing the censored content before injecting — possibly modeling typical multi-resource HTTP browsing behavior.

2023-nourin-detecting §3 detection

The authors' blockpage-based methodology cannot detect transit censorship implemented via TCP RST injection or packet drops, because distinguishing these from transient network errors requires identifying their location on the routing path. As a result, the 8-country, 6-AS finding is explicitly characterized as a lower bound on the true extent of Russian transit censorship.

2023-ortwein-towards §4.1 Gathering Blockpages / §6 Conclusion evaluation

Censored Planet measurements of psiphon.ca in AS6697 (Belarus) around the August 2020 Internet shutdown showed that Psiphon was initially blocked via connection timeouts during the shutdown itself, and then—several weeks after the shutdown ended—the censorship mechanism shifted to TCP RST injection. Outcome-typed measurement data made this two-phase mechanism change immediately visible without re-collecting any raw data.

2023-raman-advancing §4.3 detection

Manual analysis of 700+ unique packet groupings from possibly tampered connections yielded 19 high-confidence tampering signatures — up from 6 in prior work — covering 86.9% of all possibly tampered connections. Post-SYN signatures account for 43.2% of possibly tampered connections (99.5% matching a known signature), post-ACK for 16.1% (98.7%), and post-first-data-packet (PSH+ACK) for 5.3% (97.9%), with 19 signatures described as flag-sequence patterns of the form ⟨X→Y⟩ in Table 1.

2023-raman-global §4.1, Table 1 detection

Post-handshake tampering signatures (⟨SYN;ACK→RST⟩ and ⟨SYN;ACK→RST+ACK⟩) constitute 34.4% of tampered connections from Iranian networks, but over 70% from Sri Lanka networks and over 81% from Turkmenistan networks, suggesting that censors in the latter two countries disproportionately block at the IP/TCP-handshake level before any application-layer content is visible — consistent with IP-list-based blocking rather than SNI-based DPI.

2023-raman-global §4.1 detection

Censoring middleboxes predominantly use RST injection rather than in-path packet dropping because injecting forged RST/RST+ACK packets does not require the middlebox to sit in the data path — off-path copies of packets suffice. The GFW specifically injects both RST and RST+ACK packets simultaneously after an offending PSH, a known idiosyncratic signature, while Iran's censor uses post-handshake RST injection (⟨SYN;ACK→RST⟩) and packet drops at the same stage.

2023-raman-global §2.1, §4.1 detection

OONI data shows anomaly rates in Russia's top five ASes (including Rostelecom AS12389, Vimpelcom AS8402) rose from roughly 7–11% in January and early February 2022 to 12–21% in mid-March 2022, with social-media and news domains such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and BBC going from available to near-completely blocked after the invasion.

2023-ramesh-network §4.1 evaluation

Server-side censorship evasion strategies require zero client-side changes: clients bypass censorship without installing software or even being aware of the evasion, and this approach has been adopted in production tools including Psiphon's packetman. The packet manipulations exploit weaknesses in how censors track or tear down TCP connections, occurring entirely at the server during the three-way handshake.

2023-tran-crowdsourcing §1 Introduction defense

Over 7 months of Hyperquack measurements across 5,555,298 probes targeting 1,632 unique ASes, only a small number of ASes actively interfered with HTTPS connections to FCM endpoints. The majority of blocking incidents occurred in China during September 22–30, 2022, coinciding with the Party's National Congress, when nearly all measurements failed with TCP reset.

2023-xue-use §5.1, Figure 4 evaluation

Extending Geneva's genetic algorithm to the application layer automatically discovered 77 unique HTTP evasion strategies and 9 DNS evasion strategies against censors in China, India, and Kazakhstan — all requiring only unprivileged usermode modifications with no TCP/IP header access. Against India's Airtel censor, 56 of the 77 strategies succeeded; 29 worked against Kazakhstan; 22 evaded China's keyword-based HTTP censorship and 27 evaded its Host-header censorship.

2022-harrity-get §5.1, §6 evaluation

DNEye detected DoTH (DoT and DoH) blocking across the largest number of ASes in China, with interference against Cloudflare, Quad9, AdGuard, and CleanBrowsing resolvers emerging in early March 2021. Blocking patterns varied per-AS rather than following a centralized GFW DNS-level policy, indicating individual ISP implementation. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, showed coordinated SNI-based blocking of the same DoH resolvers across different ASes, indicating centralized policy.

2022-hoang-measuring §4.2, Table 5 detection

China's GFW blocks all ESNI traffic via RST packet injection following a TLS ClientHello with an encrypted SNI field, confirmed since July 2020. Russia blocks ESNI in a decentralized, ISP-level fashion across at least three identified ASes (AS28890, AS52207, AS41754), each injecting RST packets independently.

2022-hoang-measuring §4.2 detection

In AS45090 (China), the Cloudflare CDN IP 104.16.248.249 succeeds 100% of the time with SNI 'cloudflare-dns.com' but triggers TLS handshake resets 93% of the time with SNI 'mozilla.cloudflare-dns.com'. Follow-up measurements using those same SNIs against unrelated HTTPS servers (example.org, hbl.fi) reproduced the same resets, confirming that the GFW performs SNI-keyed TLS blocking independent of the destination IP.

2021-basso-measuring §V-E, Table VI detection

Internet-wide IPv4 scanning found 386,187 IP addresses yielding amplification factors ≥ 100× via TCP middlebox reflection, with 82.9% of responses from the top 1 million IPs confirmed as originating from on-path middleboxes rather than endpoints. Nation-state censorship infrastructure dominates: China's GFW alone accounts for approximately 154 million responding IP addresses sharing a 3× RST+ACK (54 bytes each) fingerprint.

2021-bock-weaponizing §5.3, §5.5, Table 4 evaluation

Nation-state censors produce characteristic TCP response fingerprints: China's GFW sends 3× RST+ACK (54 bytes each) from ~170 million IPs; Iran's infrastructure sends 402–405-byte FIN+PSH+ACK plus 54-byte RST+PSH+ACK from 8.6 million IPs (75.7% of responsive Iranian addresses); Saudi Arabia sends a 97-byte PSH+ACK plus 2× 1,354-byte PSH+ACKs at 18.9× amplification from 400,000+ IPs. Most nation-state censors produce less than 4× amplification due to compact block pages.

2021-bock-weaponizing §5.5, Table 4 detection

A low-bandwidth attacker can sustain indefinite availability attacks by periodically re-triggering residual censorship: China's 3-tuple HTTP system requires only 4 spoofed packets every 3 minutes. For 4-tuple systems requiring full source-port coverage (65,535 ports), Kazakhstan needs 1,093 packets/sec (~634 kbps HTTP) and Iran needs 729 packets/sec (~422 kbps HTTP)—achievable with commodity hardware. Iran achieved 100% attack success against all 17 geographically disparate victim vantage points tested.

2021-bock-your §V.B, §VI evaluation

Switching source IP via VPN, Tor, or HTTP proxy is the primary victim-side mitigation because residual censorship is tuple-keyed; however, if the proxy entry node's path also crosses the censor, the attacker can redirect the attack at the proxy itself. On the censor side, null-routing middleboxes could eliminate the vulnerability by validating TCP sequence/acknowledgment numbers before dropping traffic, or by replacing null routing with an explicit block-page response.

2021-bock-your §VII defense

Residual censorship—where a censor continues blocking all traffic on a 3- or 4-tuple after an initial censorship event—is active in China (HTTP: 90s 3-tuple RST injection; ESNI: 120–180s 3+4-tuple null routing), Iran (HTTP+SNI: 180s 4-tuple null routing, occasionally up to 5 minutes; protocol filter: 60s), and Kazakhstan (HTTP+SNI: 120s 4-tuple null routing). A December 2020 Quack scan found 3-tuple stateful disruption in 33 countries and null-routing censorship in 18, suggesting much broader applicability.

2021-bock-your §IV, Table I evaluation

All tested censors (China, Iran, Kazakhstan) can be triggered statelessly—without completing a TCP 3-way handshake—using a SYN with decremented sequence number followed by a PSH+ACK containing the forbidden payload. This stateless triggering enables fully off-path, source-spoofed attacks: an adversary with packet-spoofing capability can residually censor a victim pair they have no on-path access to.

2021-bock-your §IV, §V.A detection

Iran and Kazakhstan reset the residual censorship timer whenever the censor observes any matching packet from the victim, so TCP retransmissions from the victim's own stack inadvertently extend the blocking window far beyond the nominal 120–180s. China's HTTP residual censorship has only ~50% per-request reliability from some vantage points due to heterogeneous GFW middlebox load-balancing, but reliability plateaus near 100% after 7 repeated censorship triggers sent ahead of time.

2021-bock-your §IV (timer reset), §IV (reliability), Fig. 2 evaluation

The GFW only inspects two locations within an HTTP request for censored keywords: the path component of the request line and the Host header, in UTF-8 and GB 18030 encodings (with %-decoding applied). Cookie headers, custom headers (e.g., X-Tension), and POST body fields are not monitored. Even in monitored positions, only approximately 75% of requests containing censored keywords actually trigger a TCP RST disconnection.

2021-rambert-chinese §4.4 detection

After a censored connection, 50–75% of subsequent connections from the same client IP to the same server IP and port are blocked for 90 seconds even without censored keywords ("penalty box"). The penalty box is strictly scoped to the (client IP, server IP, server port) triple — other ports at the same server IP or other server IPs are unaffected. The GFW monitors HTTP keyword traffic on every TCP port, not just port 80.

2021-rambert-chinese §4.4, §4.5 detection

The GFW enforces SNI-based blocking on every TCP port (not just 443), triggering TCP RST injection and a penalty box for known-censored hostnames (e.g., facebook.com, zh.wikipedia.org) in the TLS ClientHello. The SNI blocklist is separate from the HTTP keyword blocklist — keyword-derived subdomains in the SNI did not trigger censorship. No evidence was found for indiscriminate HTTPS decryption or certificate substitution.

2021-rambert-chinese §4.6 detection

All 25 applicable client-side Geneva strategies failed when mechanically translated to server-side analogs against China's GFW, even when the only structural difference was which endpoint sent the insertion packet. Experiments with the server placed inside China and client outside also failed, indicating the GFW tracks connection initiator identity and processes client versus server packets asymmetrically—meaning server-side circumvention requires a completely independent discovery approach.

2020-bock-come §3 evaluation

The paper identifies three distinct GFW resynchronization-state triggers with protocol-specific behavior: (1) a server payload on any non-SYN+ACK packet causes resync on the next SYN+ACK or client ACK-flagged packet for all protocols; (2) a server RST causes resync on the next client packet for all protocols except HTTPS; (3) a SYN+ACK with a corrupted acknowledgment number triggers resync only for FTP. Strategy 1's 50% per-attempt success rate for HTTP is confirmed to result from the 50% probability of the GFW entering the resynchronization state on an injected RST, consistent with Wang et al. [36].

2020-bock-come §5.1 detection

The paper presents 11 purely server-side censorship evasion strategies requiring zero client-side software, successfully bypassing censorship in China, India, Iran, and Kazakhstan across DNS-over-TCP, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, and SMTP. All strategies manipulate only TCP handshake packets (primarily the SYN+ACK) and were verified against 17 versions of 6 client operating systems (Windows XP–Server 2018, MacOS, iOS, Android, Ubuntu, CentOS) with unmodified clients.

2020-bock-come §1, §5, Table 2 defense

In Iran in 2013, censors dropped or throttled certain TCP connections after 60 seconds, severely disrupting circumvention protocols like obfs4 that fuse session state with a single long-lived TCP connection, while short-lived HTTP connections were largely unaffected. obfs4 has no session concept independent of the underlying TCP connection; when that connection is terminated, all end-to-end state is lost and a new session must restart from scratch.

2020-fifield-turbo §1 detection

Between January 2017 and September 2018, ICLab conducted 53,906,532 measurements of 45,565 URLs across 62 countries and 234 ASes, detecting blocking of 3,602 unique URLs in 60 countries via DNS manipulation, TCP packet injection, and block page delivery. Iran blocked 20–30% of Alexa top-500 URLs — more than any other monitored country — while Saudi Arabia consistently blocked roughly 10%. The global trend in detected censorship shows a steady decrease, which the authors attribute to rising adoption of TLS and circumvention tools.

2020-niaki-iclab §V evaluation

Of 19,493,925 TCP packet injection events ICLab detected, only 0.7% (143,225) could be definitively attributed to censorship after multi-heuristic filtering; a further 58% (15,589,882) were RST-or-ICMP-unreachable events classified only as 'probable censorship' because ordinary network failure could not be excluded. Block pages appeared in just 3.4% of definitively-censored injections, meaning the vast majority of censor-side TCP disruption is covert. DNS manipulation detection achieved a false positive rate of approximately 10⁻⁴ using a threshold of θ=11 autonomous systems, cross-checked against block page observations.

2020-niaki-iclab §IV-B, §V-A detection

In HTTP tests, more than 50% of filter responses that indicated censorship contained an injected HTML blockpage; the remainder used TCP RST injection or connection timeout. In HTTPS measurements, canonical template matching had a failure rate of only 1.9%, and 95% of Hyperquack measurements completed within 3.5 hours across ~45,000 vantage points.

2020-raman-measuring §III-A, §IV evaluation

The Great Firewall of China does not inject blockpages — it resets connections via TCP RST injection — making it invisible to blockpage-based detection systems. In contrast, the Iran firewall accounted for 97.1% of disruptions observed in Iranian vantage points, and the Bahrain and Saudi Arabia firewalls caused 71.2% and 80.2% of disruptions respectively, all using application-layer blockpage injection.

2020-raman-measuring §V-A-2 detection

Data center VPSes predominantly experienced TCP connection timeouts and resets—with the highest-blocking VPS censoring 96.8% of tested domains—while residential ISPs were substantially more likely to inject explicit blockpages citing Roskomnadzor's registry, confirming that blocking mechanism varies significantly by network tier even when blocking rates are similar.

2020-ramesh-decentralized §VI-B evaluation

A proposed HTTP censorship detection algorithm combining status-code comparison, response-length Z-score, HTML TF-vector cosine similarity, and redirect-hostname matching achieves F1 scores of 0.83 (censored) and 0.77 (uncensored), outperforming OONI (0.80 / 0.70), length-difference methods (0.70 / 0.66), and HTML-similarity methods (0.52 / 0.34) on a manually annotated set of 3,000 responses across six Indian ISPs.

2020-singh-india §4.3, Table 1 evaluation

All detected HTTP censorship events in BSNL and MTNL are attributable to infrastructure shared with or operated by Airtel and ACT, demonstrating that upstream ISP filtering creates collateral censorship visible to downstream networks. Isolated cross-ISP leakage was also observed: Vodafone's censorship notice appeared in 2 Jio tests, and Airtel's appeared in 2 Vodafone tests.

2020-singh-india §5.1.3 evaluation

Hop-by-hop bottleneck localization showed that in more than 71% of measured paths the first lossy hop is located deep inside China (beyond the border), with only 34.45% of bottleneck hops coinciding with the GFW hop as detected by RST injection probing — suggesting Chinese ISP infrastructure underprovisioning rather than GFW intervention as the primary cause.

2020-zhu-characterizing §5, Figure 13 evaluation

Evasion strategies are strongly censor-specific: TCB Teardown strategies that achieve 80–96% against the GFW fail completely (0%) against Kazakhstan's HTTPS MITM; India's Airtel is defeated uniquely by a 'Stutter Request' (duplicating the PSH/ACK and replacing IP length to 64) at 100% success, which scores only 3% against the GFW. Geneva converged on distinct species for each censor within 4–8 hours of live training.

2019-bock-geneva Table 1, §5.1–5.4 evaluation

Geneva, a genetic algorithm using four packet-manipulation primitives (drop, tamper, duplicate, fragment), independently re-derived 30 of 36 (83.3%) previously published evasion strategies in controlled lab experiments and discovered successful strategies in 23 of 27 live training sessions against China's GFW, yielding 4 unique species, 8 subspecies (5 novel), and 21 fundamentally different variants. Each training session ran for 4–8 hours against a real censor.

2019-bock-geneva §5, Abstract defense

Geneva experiments revealed that the GFW determines TCP three-way handshake completion using only the presence of the ACK flag — without validating sequence numbers. Upon receiving a RST or RST/ACK before the handshake completes, the GFW enters a resynchronization state approximately 50% of the time rather than tearing down its TCB; strategies that exploit this pre-handshake window achieve 92–95% success rates (Strategies 3 and 4).

2019-bock-geneva §5.2 Species 2: TCB Teardown detection

Monitoring ESNI-related censorship across 14 geographic regions — including Mainland China, Iran, UAE, South Korea, and 10 others — found no blocking of ESNI traffic or interference with ESNIKey retrieval via DNS TXT records as of mid-2019, contradicting a widely circulated report claiming South Korea had already blocked ESNI. Additionally, the GFW's residual censorship window after a triggered RST was measured at 60 seconds (down from the previously reported 90 seconds).

2019-chai-importance §4.4, §6 evaluation

Oman and Qatar deploy layered blocking: after a TCP handshake to geti2p.net completes normally, a TCP RST is injected immediately after the TLS ClientHello (SNI-based blocking), while HTTP connections to the mirror site receive injected packets redirecting to explicit national block pages. Kuwait applied only the HTTP mirror block, and only at one of six tested ASes (AS47589, Kuwait Telecommunication Company), with all other Kuwaiti networks leaving I2P fully accessible—illustrating significant ISP-level variation within a single country.

2019-hoang-measuring §5.2–5.3 detection

Over one month, 54K measurements from 1.7K ASes in 164 countries detected I2P blocking in exactly five countries: China (DNS poisoning of homepage and 3 of 10 reseed servers), Iran (TCP RST injection with HTTP 403 on mirror site), Oman and Qatar (SNI-based blocking of HTTPS homepage plus TCP injection with block-page redirect on HTTP mirror), and Kuwait (TCP injection on mirror site at AS47589 only). All other tested countries left I2P fully reachable.

2019-hoang-measuring §5, Table 2 evaluation

By 2018 the GFW shifted from blocking Tor bridges by (IP, port) tuples to blocking the entire IP address. A blocked bridge remains inaccessible for exactly 12 hours; the block renews to 12 hours if any additional Tor connection attempt is made during that window, after which the GFW re-scans and removes the IP from the blacklist if Tor is no longer running.

2018-dunna-analyzing §4.2 detection

By comparing echo-server (bidirectional) versus discard-server (inbound-only) results across 11 censoring countries, Quack finds that only 4 countries (China, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey) also block inbound traffic; the remaining 7 apply DPI exclusively to outbound data. Direction-sensitive blocking is a confirmed capability of deployed middleboxes.

2018-vandersloot-quack §6.3 detection

Stateful DPI disruption in censoring countries disengages within approximately 100 seconds in 99.9% of observed cases, with roughly 50% of servers recovering within 60 seconds. A 2-minute empirically determined delay is sufficient to distinguish stateful per-connection blocking from persistent blocking when retrying with innocuous payloads against the same server.

2018-vandersloot-quack §6.1, Figure 3 detection

32 of 108 identified censoring ASes leak their censorship policies to other ASes, and 18 leak to other countries. Sweden's AS1299 leaked censorship to 9 countries including the United States, Ukraine, and Singapore; China's AS4812 leaked to 5 countries. Censorship leakage occurs when a transit AS implements filtering that affects traffic for users outside the censor's jurisdiction.

2017-cho-churn §3.3, §4, Table 3 evaluation

Censors in Russia, Iran, and India implement all three measured censorship techniques simultaneously: block pages, RST injection, and TTL anomalies. Iran and Cyprus censoring ASes censor content across many URL categories (including General News, Internet Services, Pornography, Gambling), while most other censoring ASes restrict only a few category types.

2017-cho-churn §4, Table 2 detection

Combining boolean network tomography with BGP path churn from the ICLab platform identifies 108 censoring ASes located in 49 countries across 4.9M measurements, reducing the candidate set of potential censoring ASes by 97% on average. 97.9% of constructed SAT CNFs return exactly one solution enabling exact AS-level censor identification, with less than 0.7% returning no solution.

2017-cho-churn Abstract, §4 evaluation

Tested across 11 vantage points in 9 Chinese cities against 77 Alexa-ranked websites (50 trials each, April–May 2017), most prior TCB evasion strategies are largely broken: TCB creation with SYN achieves only 6.9% success (88.9% Failure 2), TCB teardown with FIN achieves only 11.1% success (87.9% Failure 2), while in-order data overlapping with TTL-based insertion still achieves 90.6% success and only 3.7% Failure 2. Without any evasion strategy the baseline success rate is 2.8%.

2017-wang-your §3, Table 1 evaluation

The GFW evolved to create a TCB not only on SYN packets but also on SYN/ACK packets, and enters a 're-synchronization state' upon seeing multiple SYN packets, multiple SYN/ACK packets, or a SYN/ACK with an incorrect acknowledgment number. Once in this state, it re-synchronizes its TCB using the next client-to-server data packet or server SYN/ACK, invalidating prior TCB-creation evasion strategies that assumed the GFW used only the first SYN sequence number.

2017-wang-your §4 detection

INTANG, a measurement-driven tool that caches the best-performing TCP evasion strategy per server IP, achieves an average success rate of 98.3% (range 93.7%–100%) from vantage points inside China. Four combined new strategies — Improved TCB Teardown, Improved In-order Data Overlapping, TCB Creation + Resync/Desync, and TCB Teardown + TCB Reversal — each independently achieve average success rates of 94.5%–96.2% inside China and 84.6%–92.7% outside China, with Failure 2 rates below 1.1%.

2017-wang-your §7, Table 4 defense

TapDance's non-blocking asymmetric design leaves the overt connection open but abandoned, enabling an active censor to inject a TCP ACK carrying a stale sequence number; the overt server responds with its true TCP state, exposing the discrepancy and confirming decoy routing. The attack requires no clean-path routing capability: the injected packet is forwarded through the tainted path by the non-blocking TapDance station itself.

2016-bocovich-slitheen §2.2, §4.3 detection

Winter and Lindskog [157] (2012) documented that the GFW used TLS SNI inspection in combination with IP/port filtering and TCP disruption to block Tor, as recorded in the survey's Table 1. This is one of the earliest published accounts of the GFW applying SNI-based blocking specifically to a circumvention protocol, demonstrating that the GFW correlated multiple detection signals rather than relying on any single technique.

2015-aceto-internet Table 1 detection

Table 1 of the survey documents that by 2013–2014 censors were deploying simultaneous blocking across BGP, DNS, IP/port filtering, TCP disruption, TLS, and application-layer keyword filtering. No single detection tool in the survey covers all six layers; the most comprehensive, OONI (2012), covers DNS, IP/port, TCP, TLS, keyword, and HTTP but notes only partial BGP coverage.

2015-aceto-internet Table 1 detection

Yemen's national ISP (YemenNet) uses explicit blockpages for social and Internet-tools content while applying stealthy techniques — TCP RST injection and unrequited HTTP GETs — specifically for political and conflict content that is constitutionally protected. Censorship also ceases intermittently when the ISP exhausts filtering product licenses.

2015-gill-characterizing §4.2, Fig. 6 detection

Both GFW and GC injected packets share a distinctive implementation side-channel: the IP TTL field progressively increments on successive packets injected into the same connection, paired with an incrementing TCP window size. Using this compound fingerprint, the authors identified GC activity in 8 months of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory enterprise border traces with only a single false-positive source IP, and used per-hop TTL probing to localize both the GFW and GC to the same network link on China Telecom (hop 12–13, 144.232.12.211→202.97.33.37) and China Unicom (hop 17–18, 219.158.101.61→219.158.101.49).

2015-marczak-analysis §3.1, §4, §6 detection

Client-to-server packet drops (RSTs from client to server are dropped in transit) indicate the simplest null-routing mechanism: the server's destination IP is null-routed at the censor. The method distinguishes this from server-to-client drops (stateless return-path filtering) and from RST/ICMP injection—cases where the packet is not dropped but a forged termination packet is inserted—which both appear as the 'no-packets-dropped' outcome in the IPID time series.

2014-ensafi-detecting §2 detection

Pakistan's censorship used layered, evolving mechanisms: DNS redirection by local ISP resolvers appeared in all post-block traces, supplemented by HTTP 3XX redirection to a local provider's error page in Sep 2012 and shifting to RST injection by Aug 2013 (where ≈95% of YouTube HTTP requests received no response, vs. ≈2% pre-block). Porn blocking similarly combined DNS redirection with IP blocking (41% blacklist overlap) in Sep 2012 and RST injection in Aug 2013.

2014-khattak-look §4.2–4.3, Table 4 detection

On the day of YouTube's block in Pakistan (18 Sep 2012), SOHO users' HTTP:SSL traffic ratio collapsed from ~38:1 pre-censorship to ~3.2:1, and remained at ~3.25 eleven months later (Aug 2013), indicating rapid and sustained mass adoption of SSL-based circumvention. A supplementary survey of ~700 Pakistani users confirmed 57% used SSL-based VPN software (UltraSurf, OpenVPN, Hotspot Shield) to access YouTube.

2014-khattak-look §6.1, Table 7 evaluation

YouTube held an average of ~97% of SOHO video bandwidth across four pre-block traces. On the block day (18 Sep 2012) this dropped to 15.8%, with DailyMotion absorbing ~82% of 'Others' traffic. Eleven months later (Aug 2013), YouTube's unencrypted video share reached 0%, with Tune.pk at 57.6% and DailyMotion at 40.9% of total video bandwidth, reflecting a durable market reallocation among video platforms.

2014-khattak-look §7.1, Table 8 evaluation

Because TapDance does not block client-to-server packets, a censor can inject a TCP packet with a stale acknowledgment number directly to the true decoy server; the server will reply with its actual TCP sequence state, which will differ from the sequence numbers the TapDance station has been using — confirming the flow is proxied. This active packet-injection attack is qualitatively easier to execute against TapDance than against Telex or Cirripede, which used inline blocking to prevent such probes from reaching the server. Table 1 in the paper confirms that TapDance, unlike Telex, lacks replay/preplay attack resistance and has no traffic-analysis defense.

2014-wustrow-tapdance §5.2, Table 1 detection

DNS queries for blocked domains were intercepted on-path and never reached the authoritative server; instead, the DNS server received 5 TCP RST packets spoofed from the client's address — despite the original queries being UDP, a likely misconfiguration. Three RST packets carried an identical random sequence number while two had a relative offset of 30 from the first three, the same distinctive 3+2 RST pattern observed in the HTTP blocking mechanism.

2013-aryan-internet §4.3, Figure 4 detection

Iran's HTTP censorship allows the TCP three-way handshake to complete normally before acting on the HTTP GET request: the censor responds with a '403 Forbidden' and simultaneously sends 5 spoofed RST packets to the destination server (3 with in-sequence numbers, 2 with seemingly random offsets). No modifications to TCP/IP or HTTP headers were observed at either endpoint, ruling out a transparent proxy and pointing to inline DPI.

2013-aryan-internet §4.2, Figure 3 detection

Default Tor connections to a private bridge inside China were detected by the Great Firewall via active probing: an initial connection succeeded, followed by a probe from a Chinese IP address approximately 15 minutes later that performed a TLS handshake and then blacklisted the (IP, port) combination. Subsequent connection attempts resulted in a successful SYN followed by spoofed TCP RSTs terminating both the client and bridge connections.

2013-dyer-protocol §6 detection

GFW maintains TCP connection state for up to ≈10 hours and tolerates up to ≈1 GB of client-to-server data, but drastically reduces these limits when a sequence hole exists: it abandons state after buffering only 1 KB above the hole (TCP9) and times out holed connections in 60–90 minutes rather than ≈10 hours (TCP10). These thresholds were confirmed over repeated measurements and represent the maxima tested, not precise censor-configured limits.

2013-khattak-towards §5, Table 1 (TCP9, TCP10) detection

A TTL-limited bare FIN packet (without ACK) is sufficient to induce GFW to tear down its connection state for a live TCP session (TCP6b), because GFW accepts FIN packets that violate RFC 793's requirement for the ACK flag. After induced state teardown, subsequent packets carrying banned keywords on the same connection produce no RST, confirming the monitor has lost track of the flow.

2013-khattak-towards §5, Table 1 (TCP6b) detection

On-path censors commonly operate on traffic mirrors rather than inline (in-path), making their systems failure-tolerant and easier to deploy. This architectural choice means on-path injectors cannot suppress the legitimate DNS reply—both the forged and authentic replies reach the resolver—creating a detectable anomaly. The same structural weakness applies to TCP RST injection and other on-path packet injection attacks.

2012-duan-hold-on §I, §II.A detection

OONI's experiment-control methodology explicitly favors false positives over false negatives: it is preferable to generate more censorship candidate events for further investigation than to miss genuine interference. Mismatch between experiment and control data is not always a definitive signal of manipulation but is treated as sufficient cause for flagging, and data collection and analysis are treated as distinct phases.

2012-filast-ooni §4 Methodology evaluation

China's censoring devices send four spoofed RST packets per filtered connection with varying sequence and ACK numbers and TTL values corresponding to roughly the hop count to the Chinese border; the IP ID field increments sequentially per TTL group, strongly implying a small cluster of out-of-band machines co-located at each border router. Because the device is out-of-band, the actual server response still arrives at the client but is preempted by the injected RSTs.

2012-verkamp-inferring §4.2 detection

China's censoring device is stateful: it inspects only the first HTTP GET request after a TCP handshake and ignores subsequent requests or those without a preceding handshake. After blocking a request, it records the (src IP, dst IP, port, protocol) tuple and denies all further communication between that machine pair for approximately 12 hours, even for traffic that would not independently trigger censorship.

2012-verkamp-inferring §4.3 detection

Across 11 countries, censorship execution falls into at least six distinct categories: DNS redirect to localhost (Malaysia, Russia, Turkey), DNS redirect with warning page (South Korea), connection timeout with no notification (Bangladesh, India), spoofed TCP RST injection (China), spoofed HTTP 403 with warning page (Bahrain, Iran), HTTP 302 redirect (South Korea, Thailand), and spoofed HTTP 200 iframe response (Saudi Arabia). Four countries censor at DNS and eight at routers, with South Korea employing both layers simultaneously.

2012-verkamp-inferring Table 3 evaluation

During a two-month run in 2011 that coincided with the Jasmine Revolution protests, China's HTTP GET request backbone blacklist showed no additions or removals of keywords on a daily, weekly, or even monthly basis. Numerous current-event terms that triggered search engine censorship produced zero GET request RST responses, indicating the two censorship mechanisms operate on entirely different update timescales.

2011-espinoza-automated §4.2 evaluation

To measure Chinese search engine censorship independently of backbone GET request filtering, the authors split each search engine HTTP GET request across multiple TCP packets so the server would reassemble the full query but routers performing single-packet keyword inspection would not see a complete match. This technique allowed ground-truth measurement of search engine responses free of backbone RST injection interference.

2011-espinoza-automated §3 defense

During the 2011 Jasmine Revolution, words such as 'Jasmine Flower,' terms linked to Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Prize, and numeric references to presidential rent criticism triggered Chinese search engine censorship (results-removed warnings) but produced no HTTP GET request RST injections. This demonstrates that search engine filtering and backbone keyword filtering are independently operated layers that diverge sharply for rapidly evolving current-event content.

2011-espinoza-automated §4.2 detection

A PlanetLab node in Beijing successfully loaded all 100 Alexa top-100 websites through a prototype Telex station at the University of Michigan; without Telex, 17 of the 100 sites were blocked (including facebook.com, youtube.com, blogspot.com, and twitter.com from the top 10), using forged RST packets, false DNS results, and destination IP blackholes. The median latency overhead for routing through Telex was approximately 60% for the 83 unblocked sites.

2011-wustrow-telex §8.4 evaluation

The study located 495 router interfaces with attached IDS filtering devices across China, with CHINANET holding 79.4% and CNCGROUP 17.4%. The two ISPs use fundamentally different placement strategies: CHINANET distributes filtering across provincial networks (80% of its 21 served provinces operate their own filtering devices, Guangdong alone hosting 84 of 374 CHINANET interfaces), while 90% of CNCGROUP's 82 filtering interfaces concentrate in its backbone.

2011-xu-internet §4.4, Table 2, Table 3 evaluation

China's AS-level topology is shallow and concentrated: CHINANET and CNCGROUP together account for 63.9% of 133 unique foreign peerings, 87% of internal ASes are within one hop of a border AS, and just 24 border/backbone ASes serve as effective choke points for all international traffic. The TTL of GFW RST packets is now crafted to prevent IDS localization by TTL inspection, requiring TTL-incrementing probe packets to identify filtering device positions.

2011-xu-internet §3.2, §3.3, §2 evaluation

The GFW is fully stateful as of 2010: probing all 11,824 Chinese IP prefixes with single TCP packets containing the keyword 'falun' produced no RST responses, confirming that a complete TCP handshake must precede any filtering trigger. Earlier measurements (2006, 2007) reported contradictory results; this study finds statefulness is now universal across all probed prefixes.

2011-xu-internet §4.1 detection

The Great Firewall of China deploys at least four distinct, simultaneously-operating RST injectors with separate fingerprints (IPID 64, IPID -26, SEQ 1460, RAE). The RAE injector—which sets RST+ACK+ECN-nonce-sum flags—is the most common, with 4,162 distinct source IPs observed at UCB alone. Of 298 ICSI hosts disrupted by Chinese injectors, 102 showed fingerprints of two or more injectors acting independently on the same connection.

2009-weaver-detecting §7.1.6 detection

Injectors sending multiple RSTs with increasing sequence numbers to overcome the RST_SEQ_DATA race condition produce a detection signature (RST_SEQ_CHANGE) that cannot arise from a standards-compliant TCP endpoint: the second RST must have a sequence number exceeding both the preceding RST and any ACK yet observed from the receiver. This creates an inherent design tension — a robust injector that uses sequence-incremented multi-packet RSTs to ensure delivery is precisely the kind most detectable by passive monitoring.

2009-weaver-detecting §5 detection

Out-of-band RST injectors fundamentally face race conditions because they cannot modify in-flight packets: a data packet may pass the injector's observation point before the forged RST is generated, producing detectable out-of-sequence RSTs (RST_SEQ_DATA) or post-RST data packets (DATA_SEQ_RST). A passive detector exploiting these two race conditions, plus a third signature (RST_SEQ_CHANGE) from multi-packet injectors, reliably identifies injected RSTs across four network datasets totaling 30.2M TCP flows.

2009-weaver-detecting §5 detection

Individual RST injectors exhibit stable, idiosyncratic header-field fingerprints enabling device-level identification across geographically separated sites. Sandvine devices produce back-to-back RST pairs where the second packet's sequence number is exactly 12,503 higher than the first (a known implementation bug confirmed by Sandvine's CTO) with IPID increments of 4 then 1; 90% of 193 alerting Comcast IP addresses across all four datasets matched this fingerprint. The GFW SEQ 1460 injector always increments sequence numbers by 1,460 regardless of actual MTU or window size.

2009-weaver-detecting §7.1, Table 1 detection

The proposed countermeasure of ignoring RST packets with anomalous TTLs (to defeat GFW injection, per Clayton et al. 2006) is impractical: 28% of normal responder-terminated TCP flows have RST TTLs differing from prior data packets, with changes clustering around 64, 96, 128, and 192. Of 200 randomly sampled flows with differing TTLs, only 2 triggered the injection detector, confirming the high false-positive rate of single-field TTL heuristics.

2009-weaver-detecting Appendix C defense

ChinaNET (CHINANET-*) performed 324/389 = 83.3% of all filtering observed across 296 probed hosts over a two-week period, and 99.1% of all filtering that occurred at the first hop past the Chinese border, despite constituting only 77% of first-hop routers encountered.

2007-crandall-conceptdoppler §3.3.1 evaluation

GFC keyword filtering exhibits strong diurnal patterns in which filtering effectiveness drops markedly during busy network periods, sometimes letting more than one fourth of packets containing known filtered keywords pass through unimpeded; the blocking timeout after a keyword RST was measured at 90 seconds for the tested route.

2007-crandall-conceptdoppler §3.2 detection

GFC keyword filtering is distributed across the backbone, not confined to border routers: only 29.6% of filtering occurred at the first hop into China's address space, 11.8% occurred beyond the third hop (with as many as 13 hops past the border in one case), and 28.3% of the 296 probed Chinese hosts were reachable via paths with no filtering at all.

2007-crandall-conceptdoppler §3.3 detection

Post-trigger blocking persisted for an average of ~20 minutes (observed range: a few minutes to nearly an hour) per source-IP/destination-IP pair, but was scoped to the 128 TCP port numbers sharing the same 7 most-significant bits as the triggering connection's ephemeral port. On pseudo-random ephemeral-port systems such as OpenBSD, the probability of a subsequent connection falling in the blocked port range is only ~1 in 500; on sequential-port systems such as Windows, an average of 64 further connections are blocked.

2006-clayton-ignoring §6.1 evaluation

The GFW's keyword-blocking mechanism relies entirely on endpoints honoring injected TCP RST packets; because the IDS operates out-of-band and cannot remove packets already queued in the router's transmission path, configuring both endpoints to silently discard incoming RSTs (e.g., via `iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP`) allows blocked content to transfer unimpeded. In a controlled experiment, 28 injected RSTs were ignored and the complete blocked web page was successfully retrieved.

2006-clayton-ignoring §5 defense

GFW-injected RST packets are distinguishable from legitimate endpoint RSTs by TTL: in the authors' 2006 experiments forged resets carried TTL=47 while genuine server packets carried TTL=39, consistent with the IDS sitting 8 hops closer to the client than the destination server. A 20-line FreeBSD kernel patch implementing TTL-divergence filtering was developed and demonstrated positive results in practice.

2006-clayton-ignoring §7 defense

TCP RSTs are delivered unreliably and different OS stacks apply different validity rules, so a NIDS cannot safely tear down connection state on RST alone; a 'reliable RST' scheme — sending a keep-alive ACK behind every forwarded RST and tearing down state only upon observing a confirming RST from the trusted side — resolves this without violating end-to-end semantics. The cold-start problem (state loss on restart) can be addressed statelessly by stripping payload from unknown-connection packets from untrusted hosts and probing the trusted endpoint with a keep-alive before instantiating state.

2001-handley-network §6.1–6.2 defense