2026-yuan-demux-boundary-aware-multi-scale
DEMUX: Boundary-Aware Multi-Scale Traffic Demixing for Multi-Tab Website Fingerprinting
canonical link → · arxiv: 2604.15677
Abstract
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks infer the websites visited by users from encrypted traffic in anonymous networks such as Tor. Existing deep learning methods achieve high accuracy under the single-tab assumption but degrade substantially when users open multiple tabs concurrently, producing interleaved traffic that transforms WF into an implicit demixing problem. We identify three structural requirements for effective multi-tab demixing, namely signal integrity at segment boundaries, multi-scale local modeling, and relative temporal association of dispersed fragments, and show that no prior method satisfies all three simultaneously. We propose DEMUX, a designed framework that addresses these requirements through three tightly coupled components. A Boundary Preserving Aggregation Module employs overlapping window partitioning with joint packet-level and burst-level feature extraction. A Multi-Scale Parallel CNN captures heterogeneous temporal patterns via parallel branches. A two-stage Transformer encoder with Rotary Positional Embedding enables robust cross-window fragment association. The Boundary Preserving Aggregation Module additionally serves as a plug-and-play preprocessor that consistently improves existing baselines without architectural modification. Extensive experiments across closed-world, open-world, defense-augmented, dynamic-tab, and cross-configuration settings demonstrate that DEMUX achieves state-of-the-art performance. In the challenging closed-world 5-tab setting, DEMUX attains a P@5 of 0.943 and MAP@5 of 0.961, outperforming the strongest baseline by 9.2 and 6.2 percentage points respectively, confirming its strong robustness in complex multi-tab demixing scenarios.
Team notes
Auto-ingested via corpus-crawl. Tags proposed by Claude Haiku 4.5; review and tighten before relying. Improved website fingerprinting attacks highlight the need for defenses in Tor and Lantern against traffic-analysis threats; informs understanding of anonymity system vulnerabilities.