The report maps specific Belt and Road Initiative Digital Silk Road projects through which Chinese technology vendors have transferred censorship and surveillance infrastructure to Iran, including fiber backbone investments, data-center co-location agreements, and equipment supply chains. Specific vendors named include Huawei and ZTE as network infrastructure providers, with the report noting that equipment exports include filtering-capable hardware that Iran's ISPs have deployed at network choke points.

Article 19 documents that Iran's National Information Network (NIN / SHOMA) was designed with explicit reference to China's Great Firewall as a model, with institutional mirroring: Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace parallels China's Cyberspace Administration of China, and both governments share a "cyber sovereignty" doctrine used to justify domestic content controls and cross-border technology transfer. The report frames Iran's filtering infrastructure as deliberately architected to replicate GFW capabilities, not as an independently developed system.

§2, §3 policy

Article 19 documents that Iran combines technical filtering with formal coercion of major foreign platforms (including Telegram, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to comply with content removal orders under threat of full blocking. The report notes that Iran's 2022 Women Life Freedom protests accelerated platform blocking when foreign operators refused compliance, demonstrating that the censorship system operates in two modes: coerce-and-allow for compliant platforms, block for non-compliant ones. Domain fronting via these platforms is therefore subject to sudden revocation if political conditions change.

§6 policy

TSPU devices perform in-line packet manipulation — they can inject RST packets, drop traffic, and throttle connections — rather than routing traffic to an out-of-band sniffer that votes to block. The inline placement means TSPU can act on the first-packet payload and impose latency on all matching flows, not only on those selected by sampling. Blocking decisions are therefore applied with high recall at the ISP edge, and circumvention tools that rely on short observation windows (e.g. only obfuscating the first N bytes) are vulnerable to continued inline inspection of subsequent traffic.

2024-xue-tspu-russia §3–§4 dpirst-injectionthrottlingsni-blocking

During the June 2025 Iran shutdown, circumvention tool performance diverged sharply by transport design. Psiphon's multi-protocol architecture sustained 1.5 million concurrent users—roughly one-third of its normal Iranian base. Lantern's "proxyless" protocol (domain-fronting via CDN, ~40% of Lantern's Iranian traffic) showed moderate success. Tor usage collapsed during the blackout but bridge connections surged and rebounded quickly after lifting. BeePass (serving 500k+ daily users at shutdown onset) used live A/B testing of port/obfuscation-prefix combinations to probe the censors' blocking parameters in real time. The Ceno Browser's P2P network grew from 600 active peers on June 13 to ~8,000 by July 11, indicating that decentralized fallback paths stayed up even during peak blocking.

2025-iran-shutdown-measurement §Tool Performance dpithrottling

The paper identifies a fundamental architectural vulnerability in single-IP circumvention designs: a relay must generate new observable flows (via DNS or TLS SNI) to reach end services after receiving client connections, creating a detectable server-and-client behavioral contrast. A relay accessing user-facing domains (news, social media) scores high on a Relay Suspicion Score (w=0.9) versus infrastructure domains (w=0.1). The paper argues this host-level signal is censorship-invariant and cannot be concealed by link obfuscation.

2026-almutairi-server §2.4, §4 traffic-shapedpisni-blocking

QUICstep successfully circumvents the GFW's QUIC SNI censorship (active since April 2024) in live testing. Using an Alibaba VM in mainland China as client and an AWS instance in North Virginia as server, a native QUIC client was blocked after several fetches of youtube.com SNI, while QUICstep consistently succeeded across 50 consecutive fetches. 7 tiktokcdn.com subdomains that were QUIC-SNI blocked were also reliably accessible via QUICstep. The approach routes only QUIC long-header (handshake) packets through a WireGuard tunnel; all subsequent short-header (data) packets travel the native path.

2026-lee-quicstep §4.3.2, §3.2.3 http3-quic-blocksni-blockingdpi

The largest single source of censored domains in the GNL is MESA lab's SNI monitoring dataset (E21-SNI-Top200w.txt) containing 57,362 censored domains, and E21-SNI-Top120W-20221020.txt with 36,467 domains—totaling over 93K domains from network tap data alone for a single country (E21 = Ethiopia per InterSecLab attribution). A separate Xinjiang dataset (XJ-CUCC-SNI-Top200w.txt) contains 13,604 domains. These datasets "do not seem to come from popular domain lists, and instead appear to be gathered from network taps," confirming that Geedge builds censorship target lists directly from passive traffic observation.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.2, Table 3 dpisni-blockingmeasurement-platform

Of 6,915,266 domains extracted from the 572 GiB Geedge Networks Leak (GNL), 298,955 censored domains (93.7% of all GNL-censored domains) appear in neither Tranco top-1M nor CitizenLab test lists. Measurements across China (Guangzhou/Nanjing), Myanmar, Pakistan, and Algeria confirmed censorship via DNS injection and SNI-based TLS connection termination. The GNL covers 25–62% of Tranco-censored domains across countries, showing substantial but incomplete overlap. This vendor-side ground truth reveals a censorship surface roughly two orders of magnitude larger than curated academic test lists.

2026-sheffey-geedge §4.1, Table 2 dpisni-blockingdns-poisoningmeasurement-platform